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I. Introduction  
 
 A. Rejecting Post-Truth Claims 
 
 We sometimes hear that we live in a post-truth era.
1
 The press, for example, tell us that 
President Trump is “known for trafficking in mistruths and even outright lies;” that “The 
president often seeks to paint a self-serving and self-affirming alternate reality for himself and 
his supporters;” that, through May 31, 2018, “Trump had made 3,251 false or misleading claims 
in 497 days--an average of 6.5 such claims per day of his presidency;” that Donald Trump, Jr. 
has, for example, posted poorly-doctored images making “his father’s Gallup presidential 
approval rating look [ten points] higher than it actually is” while claiming “I guess there is a 
magic wand to make things happen and @realdonaldtrump seems to have it;” and that 
President Trump’s attorney, Rudy Giuliani, even claims that “Truth isn’t truth” and 
“nowadays” facts are in the beholder’s eyes.2   
                                                 
1
 Kurt Anderson, How America Lost Its Mind, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/how-america-lost-its-mind/534231/.  
2
 Ashley Parker, President Trump Seems to Be Saying More and More Things That Aren’t True, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-
trump-seems-to-be-saying-more-and-more-things-that-arent-true/2018/06/19/c1bb8af6-73d5-
11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html?utm_term=.ecc3b82c25d7 (on President Trump); Avi Selk, 
Trump’s Approval Hits 50 Percent--in a Doctored Poll Graphic Shared by His Son, The 
Washington Post (August 10, 2018).  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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 One can also read of preceding (and perhaps “precedential”) bluster like the following by 
an aide to former President George W. Bush: 
 
The aide said that guys like me [a reporter for the New York Times] were “in what we 
call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that 
solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and 
murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 
“That's not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We're an empire 
now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that 
reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which 
you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, 
all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”3 
 
To keep this Introduction reasonably brief, I set out more such quotations of the “powerful” or 
“influential” in Appendix A of this article. 
 Responsible lawyers must of course reject such “post-truth” mendacity and silliness.  
Responsible lawyers must, among other things, grasp and acknowledge applicable semantic, pre-
semantic, and other restraints explored in Section IV and Appendix C of this article.  As we shall 
see, such restraints unsurprisingly belie “magic wands,” “alternate reality,” and other such 
unworkable notions. 
 
 B. Rejecting Formalist Claims              
 . 
 However, as also discussed in Section III of this article, in exploring such semantic, pre-
semantic, and other restraints, responsible lawyers must take care not to ignore applicable 
semantic and other freedoms also discussed in this article.   
 As we shall see, such freedoms are inconsistent with formalist claims that the law is “a 
self-contained system of legal reasoning” involving deduction of “neutral” and apolitical results 
from “general principles and analogies among cases and doctrines” (including formalist claims 
that the law is like an “objective” game of baseball where judges merely call “balls and 
strikes.”)4  As discussed in more detail in Section III below, such formalism therefore also fails. 
                                                                                                                                                             
fix/wp/2018/08/10/trumps-approval-hits-50-percent-in-a-doctored-poll-graphic-shared-by-his-
son/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.16a1255eb064. The “doctored” graphic is especially brazen 
given its obvious manipulation (colors do not match, the “doctored” portion is out of line, and 
one can see another number lurking behind the “50%” “doctored” number. See id. Caroline 
Kenny, Rudy Giuliani says ‘truth isn’t truth, CNN Politics (Aug. 19, 2018),  
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/rudy-giuliani-truth-isnt-truth/index.html, (emphases 
added throughout). 
3
 Ron Suskind, Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Oct. 17, 2004),  https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-
the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html. (emphasis added). 
4
 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16-17 (1992) (defining formalism without the baseball reference).  See 
also Jim Evans, Sorry, Judges, We Umpires Do More Than Call Balls and Strikes, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 7, 2018),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/sorry-judges-we-
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 C. Embracing Hermeneutic Pragmatism’s Middle Way 
 
 In eschewing both “post-truth” and formalist errors, this article explores how responsible 
lawyers should take a middle path.  That path focuses on workable rule of law that neither 
wrecks itself by ignoring restraint that it should have recognized nor chokes itself where it might 
have breathed.  
 In exploring such workable rule of law, this article’s approach is therefore a pragmatic 
one.  Its approach is also necessarily a “hermeneutic” one.  One cannot workably grasp what one 
does not understand, and one cannot have understanding without workable notions of both 
meaning and interpretation.  This article therefore explores what I shall call hermeneutic 
pragmatism. (I use the term “hermeneutic” here both as a synonym of “interpretive” and in honor 
of Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” which recognizes that “For human beings, 
experiencing is preeminently participating in meaning.”5)  
 My overriding hope for such hermeneutic pragmatism is a high one.  I hope that an 
overview of the freedoms and restraints inherent in such pragmatism will inspire readers to 
imagine and demand leaders who are honest about legal flexibility and restraint (including those 
in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches).  I also hope such an overview will inspire 
readers to demand leaders who will insist on rule of law that “works” in all of the senses 
discussed in Section IV-C and Appendix C of this article.   
 Demands for such “workability” are urgent.  “Post-truth” and formalist errors not only 
assail us singularly. Such errors compound themselves as well. A “post-truth” president or other 
public official can, for example, feel free by definition to assert anything including asserting (by 
word or deed or both) that “truth is not truth” while also asserting that good judges are merely 
umpires making truthful calls.  Fortunately, hermeneutic pragmatism primes us to recognize and 
speak out against such contradictory nonsense.  
 
II. Six Tenets of Hermeneutic Pragmatism 
 
 Six overlapping tenets of hermeneutic pragmatism collectively help us reject both “post-
truth” and formalist errors.  These overlapping tenets recognize the inextricable role of 
experience in meaning, the instrumental nature of concepts, truth as “the state of being the case,” 
realism as being language bound, the force of the pre-semantic on law and fact, and various 
tensions between semantic freedoms (on the one hand) and semantic and pre-semantic restraints 
(on the other hand).  Collectively, these six tenets guide us along hermeneutic pragmatism’s 
middle path. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
umpires-do-more-than-call-balls-and-strikes/2018/09/07/bd6ba7a2-b227-11e8-a20b-
5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.6ed3461b9e07 (rejecting the notion that even baseball 
umpires merely call balls and strikes).  See also Section III below on applicable semantic 
freedoms inconsistent with such formalist claims.  
5
 See Hermeneutical or Hermeneutic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2014) and JEAN GRONDIN, HANS-GEORG GADAMER A BIOGRAPHY 287 (Joel Weinsheimer tr., 
Yale 2003). 
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 A. The Inextricable Role of Experience in Meaning
6
 
 
 1. Sense and Reference 
 
Since our understanding of any given discourse depends upon the meanings of our terms, 
hermeneutic pragmatism straightforwardly begins by exploring the very nature of meaning itself. 
Recognizing straightaway that the same person, place, or thing can have multiple meanings (my 
brother is also my parents’ son), hermeneutic pragmatism also straightforwardly recognizes that 
any workable theory of meaning must parse between sense (the cognitive or mental component 
of meaning) and reference (that to which the term refers as fact or fiction).
7
  Meaning must have 
a sense component to account for the different meanings (such as brother or son) the same 
person, place, or thing may have.  Meaning must also have a reference component to tie meaning 
to the specific portions of the objective or fictional world of experience and to tie together the 
different senses those specific portions may have.
8
  To give a Constitutional example, parsing 
sense and reference allows a lawyer to refer to the same individual (the reference) as either the 
“Vice President” or the “President of the Senate” (with the difference of meaning thereby lying 
in the different senses of the terms).
9
  Hermeneutic pragmatism thus embraces notions of 
meaning that workably recognize this mixed role of sense and reference.
10
   
 
2. Meaning and Experience 
 
Grasping that meaning involves both sense and reference, how do we effectively 
distinguish the meaning of one term (such as “Vice President”) from the meaning of another 
term (such as “President of the Senate”)? Hermeneutic pragmatism looks at the differences in 
how such terms play out in experience.  More precisely, if one understands “experience” to 
include both external experience (i.e., objective or public experience) and internal experience 
(i.e., private
11
 experience such as thoughts and memories), hermeneutic pragmatism embraces 
the following modified version of Charles Sanders Peirce’s early pragmatic notion of meaning: 
the sense of a particular concept is the total actual and possibly-conceivable
12
 ways in which that 
                                                 
6
 This section draws from Harold Anthony Lloyd, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising 
Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal Theory, Practice, and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1213 (2014) & Harold Anthony Lloyd, Theory Without Practice Is Empty; Practice 
Without Theory Is Blind: The Inherent Inseparability of Doctrine and Skills, in THE DOCTRINE-
SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 77-91 (Linda H. Edwards ed., 
2017). 
7
 See WINFRIED NÖTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 92-100 (Indiana Univ. Press, 1995) (1985). 
8
 See id.  
9
 See id. 
10
 Such workability leads to the notion of instrumentality discussed in Section II-B below. 
11
 By private experience, I mean experience private to the individual such as (without limitation) 
a thought or pleasant or painful sensation. 
12
 Again, this can include private experience. “Possible” incorporates a normative as well as 
factual sense. For example, it is not possible in common speech for a typical horse to have eight 
legs. Section IV-B and IV-C below discuss linguistic pushback in more detail. 
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concept plays out in such experience.
13
 The different senses of “Vice President” and “President 
of the Senate” thus depend upon the different ways such notions play out in such experience. 
 This approach to meaning fits how we use “meaning” in court, in the practice of law, and 
in law school.  If one asks good lawyers, for example, what an actual or proposed contract 
means, such lawyers would “flesh it out,” would describe how the contract would play out in 
practice.  For example, if the actual or proposed contract contained an indemnity with a cap of 
one hundred dollars on the indemnitor’s liability, the explanation would include a statement that 
in no scenario would the indemnitor be required to pay more than that amount.  If a term were 
vague or ambiguous, the explanation would include tales of how various persons might read the 
term and how such tales might or likely would turn out. One would flesh out, for example, a 
statute in similar ways. Similarly, if one asks a good lawyer what her client’s “emotional injury” 
means, such a lawyer would not only set out objective symptoms but would include the client’s 
internal sufferings and other such experiences as well. Throughout this article, I shall therefore 
take the “meaning” of concepts in the way proposed above.14   
 In doing so, hermeneutic pragmatism, again, takes “experience” in the broad internal and 
external senses discussed above.  It would therefore have difficulties with Felix Cohen’s more 
narrow statement that in “modern jurisprudence” a word “that cannot pay up in the currency of 
fact, upon demand, is to be declared bankrupt, and we are to have no further dealings with it.”15 
This is, of course, a much too constricted notion of meaning.  Fictional moot court problems, for 
example, have meaning and play important roles in training lawyers even though they do not 
                                                 
13
 Peirce’s early formula reads: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE  § 5.402  (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds. (vols. 1-
6) & Arthur Burks ed. (vol. 7-8), 1931-58) (c.1906). To the extent Peirce’s formula focuses only 
on objective experience and therefore results in beliefs being synonymous if they cause the same 
habits, I would disagree.  See JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 25-26 
(1990). For example, I could have a habit of walking from my desk to the front door in just the 
same manner whether I believe that my neighbor or a stranger is at the door. See also WILLIAM 
JAMES, PRAGMATISM 18 (Thomas Crofts & Philip Smith eds., Dover 1995) (1907) (setting out 
James’s interpretation of Peirce’s notion of meaning). 
14
 This is all also consistent with Gadamer’s claim that “It is only in all its applications that the 
law becomes concrete,” see HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 322 (Joel 
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHOD]. as well as Gadamer’s further claim that “knowledge that cannot be applied to the 
concrete situation remains meaningless and even risks obscuring what the situation calls for.” Id. 
at 311. 
15
 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM L. REV. 
809, 823 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen].  Hermeneutic pragmatism also rejects Cohen’s “definition 
of legal concepts, rules, and institutions in terms of judicial decisions or other acts of state 
force.” Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 8 
(1937).  Dissents, for example, have meaning even though the state will not enforce them.  
Additionally, lawyers and other legal scholars (along with the rest of a linguistic community) can 
debate and influence the meaning of legal concepts and can of course meaningfully maintain that 
judicial or other decisions have misinterpreted such concepts. 
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involve actual facts.  Hypotheticals can also help legal analysis even though they do not involve 
actual facts.  More broadly, fictional literature also has meaning even though such meaning is not 
factual. We are also always free to imagine much and such imagination has meaning. 
Hermeneutic pragmatism fully recognizes that all such examples have meaning although, again 
as discussed in Section IV and Appendix C below, there is much experiential and other restraint 
on what can be considered workably “real” despite any “post-truth” claims to the contrary. 
 
 B. Instrumentality and Workability 
 
 Given the desire for “workable” meaning discussed in Section II-A above, hermeneutic 
pragmatism thus also treats concepts as instruments which help us better organize and predict 
experience.
16
  Thus, hermeneutic pragmatism agrees with the great American pragmatist William 
James that concepts must work “with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being 
omitted.”17  As we shall see in Section IV-C and Appendix C below, the italicized language 
encompasses moral as well as other experience. Given the demand for such complete workability 
across experience, hermeneutic pragmatism expressly rejects the dangerous “nihilism, relativism, 
irresponsibility, and the like”18 characteristic of the subterfuge and silliness quoted in Section I-A 
above. 
 
 C. Truth as “The State of Being the Case” 
 
 Hermeneutic pragmatism, however, is careful not to equate “truth” itself with such 
Jamesian “workability.”  Instead, it requires definitions of truth to have such Jamesian 
“workability” (again as more fully fleshed out in Section IV-C and Appendix C below).  For 
purposes of this article, I will therefore use the common definition of “truth” as “the state of 
being the case”19 with the further understanding that our conceptual schemes and semantic 
lifeworlds discussed in Sections III and IV below define what is the case and that these 
definitions must be “workable in the senses discussed in Section IV-C and Appendix C below.20   
                                                 
16
 See JAMES, supra note 13, at 21 (theories are “instruments” and “[one] must bring out of each 
word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of [one’s] experience.”)  However, 
as discussed in Section IV-B-5-a below, our words often have long pedigrees and can take on 
lives of their own. Rather than always using a word as “some arbitrary tool which can be thrown 
in a corner if it doesn't do the job;” one should instead recognize when such a word involves “a 
line of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond . . . .” See GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHOD, supra note 14 at 552.  
17
 See JAMES, supra note 13, at 32 (Thomas Crofts & Philip Smith eds., Dover 1995) (1907) 
(emphasis added).  
18
  See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 189 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT] (discussing such charges against postmodernsim).  
19
 Truth, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).  
20
 Compare James’s looser formulation in JAMES, supra note 13, at 31-32. (“Pragmatism’s “only 
test of probable truth is what works best” in the full sense described above). For a concise review 
of various philosophical definitions of truth, see Truth, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005).  
8 
 
Thus, for example, lawyers who are debating whether or not certain facts are “true” in a 
particular case will be constrained by prevailing views of how one determines what is the case--
though such lawyers can challenge the workability of such views. 
 
 D. Realism as Language Bound 
 
 Because we cannot meaningfully speak of worlds or anything else without the use of 
language, hermeneutic pragmatism also straightforwardly recognizes that worlds in which we 
live are language bound and have meaning in the quasi-Peircean sense discussed in Section II-A 
above.  As Hilary Putnam puts it:  “To talk of ‘facts’ without specifying the language to be used 
is to talk of nothing; the word ‘fact’ no more has its use fixed by Reality Itself than does the 
word ‘exist’ or the word object’.”21  Thus, when we speak of what is “real,” we must do so 
within a given conceptual scheme.  We can therefore have the “real” but to have it in any 
meaningful sense we need language to define it.  Thus, as Putnam also notes, “The world does 
not speak. Only we do.”22 In Sections III and IV below, I shall therefore discuss in further detail 
applicable freedoms and constraints involving concept creation as well as any attendant 
“realism” we might have within the conceptual schemes we create. As we shall see in Section IV 
below, significant restraints apply to such language-bound realities, restraints that prohibit, for 
example, presidential “magic wands.” 
  
 E. The Force of the Pre-semantic on Law and Fact 
 
 Despite the language-bound nature of worlds in which we live, hermeneutic pragmatism 
also straightforwardly recognizes that we encounter forces currently beyond the meaningful 
words at our disposal, forces to which I shall simply refer without further interpretation as the 
“pre-semantic.”23  For example, as Jens Zimmermann notes, we can “have a toothache, or we 
                                                 
21
 HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 36 (1987) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MANY 
FACES].  
22
 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 6 (1989) [hereinafter RORTY, 
CONTINGENCY].  As I read him, Gadamer makes a similar point: “Each science, as a science, has 
in advance projected a field of objects such that to know them is to govern them.”  GADAMER, 
TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 449. In language that sounds very similar to Gadamer, 
Putnam also claims: “If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the 
mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.” HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A 
HUMAN FACE 262 (James Conant ed. 1990) [hereinafter PUTNAM, HUMAN FACE]. Continuing 
with my parsing between the pre-semantic and the linguistic, if the mind and the world are both 
properly taken as linguistic constructs, then this metaphor makes good sense to me.   
23
 I acknowledge the complexities of reference and the various debates as to its nature.  See 
Referring, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
(“Intuitively, for an expression to refer is for it to stand for or pick out something, but what this 
involves has long been debated.  According to Frege the reference of an expression is determined 
by its sense, but lately Kaplan and Kripke have argued that some terms such as demonstratives, 
proper names, and natural-kind terms, refer directly.”)  I lack the space to explore reference in 
detail here and will trust that the reader can imagine along with me the possibility of referring to 
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[can] sense heat, before we can put these sensations into words and interpret them.”24 However, 
as Zimmermann also notes, we cannot have a “meaningful experience without understanding 
pain or temperature first within a cultural vocabulary by which we make sense of things.”25   To 
avoid confusion going forward, hermeneutic pragmatism carefully distinguishes between the 
“pre-semantic” and the semantic. The latter includes such semantically-interpreted notions as the 
“world” or “experience.” The latter therefore includes both sense and reference.  The former, on 
the other hand, includes only reference
26
 as, again, in Zimmerman’s case of sensing heat before 
we have a concept of heat.  I discuss in Section IV below the pushback of both semantic and pre-
semantic restraints. 
 Such a distinction between the semantic and the pre-semantic can also hopefully explain 
away apparent contradictions in claims such as postmodern pragmatist Richard Rorty’s claim 
that “The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.”27  (“World” has both sense 
and reference.  Thus, does not Rorty broadly describe what he says he does not, i.e., the world?)  
We can eliminate such questions by translating Rorty’s phrase into: “The pre-semantic is out 
there, but descriptions of the pre-semantic are not.”  (Since we are using “pre-semantic” as a 
term of pure reference, there should be no imputation of sense outside of language here.) This 
also similarly helps us polish Grondin’s claim that “There is no ‘pre-verbal’ world, only world 
oriented to language, the world which is always to be put in words, though never entirely 
successfully”28 into the more consistent (though perhaps less polished) “There is no ‘pre-verbal’ 
world, only the pre-semantic which is oriented to language, the pre-semantic which is always to 
be put in words.” Taking such care with language also helps us truly appreciate Gadamer’s 
eloquence: “Where the word breaks off, no thing may be”29 and language is “the all-embracing 
form of the constitution of the world.”30  Again, as further noted in Sections IV-A, and IV-C 
below, hermeneutic pragmatism must wrestle with such pure reference of the pre-semantic. 
 Such a distinction between the semantic and the pre-semantic should remind judges, 
lawyers, and law students that much always remains “to be put in words” and that much that 
                                                                                                                                                             
the yet to be interpreted. “Prudence prepares as best it can for the known as well as the 
unknown,” for example, seems to me to refer to the uninterpreted as well as the interpreted. 
24
 JENS ZIMMERMANN, HERMENEUTICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 14 (2015). Peirce’s 
definition of “feeling” may be helpful here: “an instance of that sort of element of consciousness 
which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else.” PEIRCE, § 1.306 
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 13.  As such, it “involves no analysis, comparison or any process 
whatsoever . . . .” Id.  
25
 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 24, at 14.  
26
 See again supra note 23 on reference. Again, I will trust that the reader can imagine along with 
me the possibility of referring to the yet to be interpreted. (Does this sentence on its face not do 
just that?) 
27
 RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 22, at 5. “World” has both sense and reference.  Thus, does 
not Rorty broadly describe what he says he does not, i.e., the world? 
28
 JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS xv (Joel Weinsheimer 
trans., 1994). 
29
 GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 483. “Thing” has sense as well as reference 
and thus requires language.  The pre-semantic as pure reference lacks such sense. 
30
 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 3 (David E. Linge, ed., trans., 1976) 
[hereinafter GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS]. 
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should be addressed may often be missing in matters under consideration. Judges, lawyers, and 
law students should thus be ever vigilant as to the completeness or incompleteness for their 
current purposes of concepts and terms currently in play. I shall return to this point when 
discussing concept creation and deconstruction in Section III below. 
 
  F. Tensions between Semantic Freedoms and Semantic and Pre-semantic                       
Restraints 
 
 Finally, since “foundations” are linguistic terms themselves, hermeneutic pragmatism 
honestly recognizes that our terms do not rest on any foundations transcending language.  Since 
language defines foundations and we have much potential freedom in how we define our terms, 
lawyers and others thus have much potential freedom in how they might define and redefine 
foundations and thereby ground and reground their terms and concepts.  However, as we shall 
see in Section IV below, lawyers and others also face much restraint on such potential freedom.  
As such, judges, lawyers, and law students should not overestimate such freedoms.  As we shall 
see in Sections III and IV below, judges, lawyers, and law students should properly weigh 
applicable freedoms and restraints and not fall into errors of underestimation or overestimation.  
Formalists, for example, can underestimate the freedoms of framing in legal reasoning 
discussed below
31
 while “post-truth” people can speak of “magic wands” and otherwise 
overestimate such freedoms. To better gage such freedoms and restraints, I shall next turn in 
more detail to the freedoms recognized by hermeneutic pragmatism.  After that, I shall explore in 
more detail applicable tempering restraints. 
 
III. Making Workable Sense: Law, Fact, and Overlapping Semantic Freedoms 
 
 A. Creating Meaning: Human Metaphors, Categories, and Concepts 
 
 Hermeneutic pragmatism, as we have seen, defines the sense of a concept as the total 
actual and possibly-conceivable
32
 ways in which that concept plays out in experience (including 
both “objective” and internal experience).33  Although judges, lawyers, and law students are 
always already surrounded by such meaning, although they “are always already encompassed by 
the language that is [their] own,”34 they can also always try to re-describe35 including trying to 
                                                 
31
 See generally Harold Anthony Lloyd, Good Legal Thought: What Wordsworth Can Teach 
Langdell About Forms, Frames, Choices, and Aims, 41 VT. L. REV. 1, 1-22 (2016). 
32
 Again, this can include private experience. Again, possible also includes a normative as well 
as factual sense: it is not possible in common speech for a typical horse to have eight legs. 
33
 Again, Peirce’s formula reads: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS § 5.402, supra 
note 13 . Again, to the extent Peirce’s formula focuses only on objective experience and 
therefore results in beliefs being synonymous if they cause the same habits, I would disagree.  
See again MURPHY, supra note 13, at 25-26.  
34
 GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 62. Not inconsistent with this modified Peircean 
notion of meaning, Gadamer also notes that “we consider application to be just as integral a part 
of the hermeneutical process as our understanding and interpretation.” Id. at 307. Gadamer also 
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change any concepts and categories in play.  They can thus always attempt to use new 
metaphors, categories, and concepts to cause belief changes.
36
  I shall therefore explore these 
tools as ways of drawing and “redrawing the boundaries between ourselves and [the pre-
semantic]”37 
 
 1. Freedoms in Creating Metaphors, Categories and Concepts
38
 
 
 When judges, lawyers, and law students describe or re-describe, they often use 
metaphors, devices which on their face equate different things.
39
  For example, if by “labyrinth” 
a lawyer drafting a contract means “a place constructed of or full of intricate passageways and 
blind alleys,”40 then his claiming “this contract is a labyrinth” is a metaphor because it equates a 
particular contract with a physical place that it is not, i.e., a “a place constructed of or full of 
intricate passageways and blind alleys.”41  (Similes, by contrast, emphasize likeness without the 
bolder assertion of equivalence as in, for example, “that contract is like a labyrinth.”)42    
                                                                                                                                                             
notes that “knowledge that cannot be applied to the concrete situation remains meaningless and 
even risks obscuring what the situation calls for.” Id. at 311. Gadamer also, in Michael J. Clark’s 
words, laments the “rift” between “techne (skill or craft) and phronesis (practical-moral 
judgment).” Michael J. Clark, Foucault, Gadamer, and the Law: Hermeneutics in Postmodern 
Legal Thought, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 111, 119 (1994). 
35
 See RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 22, at 73. 
36
 See id. at 50 (addressing Davidson and new metaphors as causes rather than reasons for belief 
changes).  
37
 See ALAN MALACHOWSKI, RICHARD RORTY 128 (2002). 
38
 This section draws upon Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law as Trope: Framing and Evaluating 
Conceptual Metaphors, 37 Pace L. Rev. 89 (2016) [hereinafter Lloyd, Law as Trope]. 
39
 See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 100 (2d ed. 1991) (A metaphor 
is an “assertion of identity rather than, as with [s]imile, likeness.”)   
40
 Labyrinth, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/labyrinth 
(last visited July 15, 2018).  
41
 This metaphor example can also show how metaphors can go “dormant.” See CH. PERELMAN 
& L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION  405-10 (John 
Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969). If by “labyrinth” the lawyer had instead meant 
“something extremely complex or tortuous in structure,” there would be no such metaphorical 
reference to a “place” in space. Labyrinth, supra note 40. Thus, if the lawyer means this second 
sense of “labyrinth,” his assertion would no longer involve a “live” metaphor. One can 
sometimes track this development of dormancy in the order of dictionary listings.  For example, 
in listing defintions, Merriam-Webster’s unabridged dictionary “tends to give the oldest sense 
first.” The Order of the Definitions May Not Mean What You Think, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/dictionary-facts-and-trivia/the-order-of-the-
definitions-may-not-mean-what-you-think (last visited July 31, 2018). 
42
 See LANHAM, supra note 39, at 100 (A metaphor is an “assertion of identity rather than, as with 
[s]imile, likeness.”)  For the difference between metaphor and metonymy (i.e., the use “of one 
entity to refer to another that is related to it” such as when a server refers to a customer as “the 
ham sandwich” because of what he ordered), see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 35-40 (2003) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS]. 
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 Building on the notion of metaphor (which, again, equates different things as with “Life 
is a cloud that no two people see the same”43), judges, lawyers, and law students create 
categories which are “sets of things” “treated as if they were, for the purposes at hand, similar or 
equivalent or somehow substitutable for each other.”44  (In this article, I shall use “category” and 
“concept” interchangeably.)  Membership in such categories turns upon “the criteria chosen to 
measure likeness or unlikeness.”45   For example, one law firm might define a promotable 
associate as one who bills 1800 hours per year while another might set the criterion at 1900 
billable hours per year. Other firms might not consider billable hours at all. The application of 
“promotable associate” to a given associate in a given firm will therefore turn on such criteria. 
(This example also underscores another point: there is no “natural” category here of the 
“promotable associate” since the term turns on the criteria that we choose.  Since we could say 
the same about any other term we use, this also helps us to see that there are no natural categories 
apart from the linguistic systems we use-- categories, in other words, ultimately come from us 
and the languages we use.
46
 )  
 Why are categories important for judges, lawyers, and law students?  First, as 
hermeneutic pragmatism recognizes, linguistic tools such as categories are needed to provide 
meaning in an otherwise semantic vacuum in which no worlds or other notions can exist.  Again, 
in my revised Grondin, "There is no ‘pre-verbal’ world, only the pre-semantic which is oriented 
to language, the pre-semantic which is always to be put in words."
47
 And in Gadamer’s words, 
"Where the word breaks off, no thing may be”48 and language is “the all-embracing form of the 
constitution of the world.”49    
Second, as hermeneutic pragmatism also recognizes, judges, lawyers, and law students 
(like all other thinkers) use categories to organize experience in ways that hopefully make such 
experience more predictable and thus easier and hopefully safer to manage.
50
  By categorizing 
experiences together they do not have to debate every experience anew but can treat “similar” 
experiences in already-decided ways.  For example, if a lawyer has decided that all of her 
associates are competent and are not likely to make a mistake when drafting a purchase and sale 
agreement, she can act accordingly without further analysis when in the future she needs one of 
them to draft a purchase and sale agreement.
51
  Knowing that such categories ultimately come 
from us via our language and not from an external nature, greatly empowers us (in theory at 
least) to mold our categories in ways that better manage our experience. However, as we shall 
also see in Section IV and Appendix C below, this vast possible flexibility is subject to much 
restraint in practice. 
 
 
                                                 
43
 See LANHAM, supra note 39, at 100 (A metaphor is an “assertion of identity rather than, as with 
[s]imile, likeness.”)   
44
 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 20 (2002). 
45
 Id. at 49.  
46
 See id. at 50. 
47
 See Section II-E above. 
48
 GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 483.  
49
 GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 3.  
50
 Id. at 21-26. See also Section II-B above on the instrumentality of concepts and categories. 
51
 See GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 30, at 25-26.  
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 2. Freedoms in Retention, Framing and Adjustment of Categories 
 
 Hermeneutic pragmatism recognizes much freedom (in theory at least) in retaining, 
framing, and adjusting categories.  
 As for retaining categories, as Quine puts it: “Any statement can be held true, come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”52  For example, we can 
even theoretically attempt to thwart “recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by 
amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws”53 In other words, in theory at least, 
“there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reëvaluate in the light of any single 
contrary experience.”54 However, as we shall see in Section IV and Appendix C below, 
plausibility and other restraints also apply to such “latitude of choice.” 
 As for reframing and adjustment, such reframing and adjustment can even involve a 
complete reversal or reframing of a concept even where such change at first may seem 
experientially impossible or “uncontrollable.” Peirce makes this point with the example of 
Schroeder’s stairs:55 
 
 
As Peirce notes, when looking at the diagram: 
 
[Y]ou seem to be looking at the stairs from above. You cannot conceive it otherwise. 
Continue to gaze at it, and after two or three minutes the back wall of the stairs will jump 
forward and you will now be looking at the under side of them from below, and again 
cannot see the figure otherwise. After a shorter interval, the upper wall, which is now 
near to you, will spring back, and you will again be looking from above. These changes 
will take place more and more rapidly . . . until at length, you will find you can at will 
make it look either way.
56
 
 
 To take a less abstract and more heartening example of such power of framing, Alan 
Malachowski reminds us that: 
 
                                                 
52
 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 43 (2d ed., rev. 1980). 
53
 Id.  
54
 Id. at 42-43.  
55
 PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS § 7.647, supra note 13.  
56
 Id. 
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When someone like South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu sincerely describes his 
cancer as ‘a blessing,’ as something that has greatly increased his appreciation of the 
value of life, and then other people in similar positions come to share his sentiments, 
perhaps the otherwise recalcitrant image of this kind of illness as being something that 
represents the sort of ‘brute power’ and ‘naked pain’ over which we have little causal 
control is thereby undermined.
57
 
 
 This freedom to reframe or even change or reject categories is of extreme importance. 
Not only can we thereby make our working categories more precise, we can also change or reject 
entirely categories that are otherwise factually, legally, or morally unworkable. Knowing, for 
example, that categories come from us and not from nature can allow us to abolish such evils as 
slavery even though slavery no doubt seemed an inherent part of nature to many at the time of its 
abolition.
58
 
 However, again, hermeneutic pragmatism demands that any such adjustments or 
rejections of frames or categories be workable in the senses discussed in Section IV-C and 
Appendix C.  This includes working “sufficiently well enough for [the user] to function.”59  If 
the stairs in the above diagram, for example, do descend from above, even the craftiest lawyer 
will have a nasty surprise approaching them otherwise.  
 
 B. Freedoms in Playing Up and Playing Down
60
 
 
 Taking a deeper look at how concepts actually work, hermeneutic pragmatism also notes 
two primary functions of concepts: “highlighting certain properties” and “downplaying . . . , [or] 
hiding still others.”61  Pardoning the pun, concepts thus play up and play down as we just saw in 
a different way with Schroeder’s stairs above. (We shall also further explore these functions of 
highlighting and hiding in Section III-C on deconstruction.) 
 
 For example, a villainous person wishing to damage the reputation of his neighbor’s 
daughter might refer to the very same event by these very different statements: 
 
My decrepit neighbor’s daughter had a quiet and very involved conversation with a much 
younger man last night. 
 
My hard-of-hearing neighbor’s daughter talked quietly and at length on the phone last 
night with a man other than her husband. 
                                                 
57
 MALACHOWSKI, supra note 37, at 128-29. 
58
 See FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 18, at 87 (“Southern proponents of 
slavery tended to argue that natural law imposed a natural order on society, with slaves 
supposedly entrenched in their proper role (at the bottom)”). 
59
 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 21 (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF 
& JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY]. 
60
 This section draws upon Lloyd, Law as Trope, supra note 38. 
61
 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 42, at 163; see also id. at 152. The nature of 
conceptualization, of course, requires this.  Since a concept differs from the thing 
conceptualized, there cannot be a perfect one to one match.  See, e.g., id. at 13. 
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My elderly neighbor’s daughter talked with her son yesterday.62 
 
Although possibly all truthful, these statements highlight and downplay various aspects 
of what happened and are thus incomplete and biased. The first two statements might help the 
villainous neighbor’s calumny while the third likely would not.  In any event, a good lawyer in 
voir dire, for example, who is considering the daughter as a potential juror in an alienation of 
affections case cannot uncritically accept any such biased and incomplete statements.
63
  Instead, 
a good lawyer in voir dire will investigate what such statements highlight, downplay, and hide.   
 Hermeneutic pragmatism would also make judges, lawyers, and law students aware that 
glossing over the incomplete and biased nature of concepts can result in missed opportunities 
provided by “the alternative categories [they] did not use.”64  This can occur at multiple levels 
including levels of both structure and strategy.  For example, hermeneutic pragmatism 
recognizes that a lawyer representing a client seeking “to lease” land does not serve her client 
well if she does not consider whether other possible means of controlling the land (such as a 
purchase) might better serve her client’s interests.  To engage in such further considerations, she 
must, of course, sufficiently inquire about the client’s perceived and actual needs and interests.  
If, for example, she finds that the client wishes to control the land for several generations, she 
might better serve her client by suggesting a purchase.   
As to possible strategic opportunities missed, if a lawyer always sees negotiation through 
the metaphor of combat, she forgets that negotiation can be (and often ought to be) cooperative.
65
 
Taking such a combative approach, she may thus unwittingly harm her client by negotiating a 
worse deal than she might otherwise have done.  This, too, seems an especially important lesson 
in today’s combative times. 
 All this said, taking care to appreciate the categories and metaphors in play is hardly 
always easy. As Amsterdam and Bruner note, we not only often “experience the world as 
categorized and simply take this experience for granted, as given,”66 but at least ninety-five 
percent of thought may be “below the surface of conscious awareness.”67 All this thus means that 
grasping what our concepts and metaphors highlight and conceal is a constant and often difficult 
struggle, a struggle compounded by the need to recognize that freedoms here are at the same 
time subject to restraints as discussed in Section IV and Appendix C below. 
 
 C. Law and Deconstruction Insights 
 
 Given how concepts highlight and conceal, hermeneutic pragmatism also finds useful 
insights in Derrida’s notion of deconstruction which also shows, among other things, how our 
concepts highlight some meanings while concealing others.  
                                                 
62
 For another example, see id. at 163.  
63
 Nor can a good lawyer as citizen do the same on broader social or political issues.  Is welfare a 
“safety net” or a “handout” for example? See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 44, at 51. 
64
 Id. at 49. 
65
 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 46, at 10.  
66
 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 44, at 26.   
67
 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 59, at 13.  
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 Derrida believes that the meaning of words is determined relationally so that any 
concepts or terms always involve other concepts or terms.
68
  To elucidate this, Derrida uses the 
French word for "to differ” (“différer”) which can refer not only to the “different” but also the 
“deferred.”69  He thus coins the term “différance”70 to capture such double meaning embracing 
“difference” (which he sees as “distinction, inequality, or discernability”) and the “deferred” 
(which he sees as “the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that 
puts off until ‘later’ what is presently denied, [or] the possible that is presently impossible.”)71  
 Given both the freedom to construct concepts and metaphors as well as their tendency 
both to highlight and conceal as discussed above, looking for both the differences and the 
deferred involved in such concepts and metaphors is obviously useful for anyone who would use 
language including lawyers, judges, and law students. Inquiring both into how chosen terms 
differ from other possibilities as well as inquiring into meanings deferred or suppressed helps the 
language user better understand both the good and the bad of particular turns of phrase. 
 For example, when reviewing draft or actual legislation, one should ask how the chosen 
terms in the draft or actual legislation differ from other possible choices, how the chosen terms 
interrelate with other terms, and therefore ask what is being “deferred” as well as what is being 
highlighted by the draft or actual legislation. Thus, if proposed legislation is offered to balance a 
budget, good lawmakers should also not only study the chosen terms of the legislation but also 
study what might not be expressly addressed yet impacted nonetheless.  Would necessary 
infrastructure programs suffer? Would defense capabilities suffer? Would needed social 
programs suffer? Would any such damage here outweigh the “good” of such a balanced budget? 
 A judge writing her opinion should no less ask how the chosen terms differ from other 
chosen terms, how the chosen terms interrelate with themselves and the subject of the opinion, 
and how the opinion might affect the “deferred” or unexpressed. 
 Justice no doubt demands such deconstruction,
72
 and hermeneutic pragmatism agrees 
with Balkin that deconstruction (at least in the sense suggested above) “is not a denial of the 
legitimacy of rules and principles; it is an affirmation of possibilities that have been overlooked 
or forgotten in the privileging of particular ideas.”73 
                                                 
68
 See DOUGLAS E. LITOWITZ, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY & LAW 88 (1997) (noting that Derrida 
is extending insights of Saussure and other structuralists who “held that social and psychological 
phenomena were best understood as a struggle or tension between component structures which 
derive their meaning in relation to other components” and thus also noting “The sound ‘bat’ and 
the concept ‘dog’ have no meaning in isolation, but they make sense when understood 
relationally, as parts within a structural system of sounds and concepts.”). 
69
 Jacques Derrida, “Differance,” in FROM MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN ANTHOLOGY 
225 (Lawrence Cahoone ed., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter CAHOONE]. 
70
 Discussing the cleverness of this neologism exceeds the bounds of this article. I would note, 
however, that in French “différant” sounds the same as the standard word “différent” thus aurally 
ignoring and thus deferring difference that sight discerns.  See id. note ii. 
71
 Id. at 225. 
72
 Derrida in fact claims that “Deconstruction is justice.” Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The 
“Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920, 945 (1990). 
73
 J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 763 (1987). 
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 However, if one takes deconstruction to mean that texts’ meanings are ultimately 
undecidable at any given point in time,
74
 such a notion cannot work in the law.  Judges must 
decide cases, and lawyers must give advice on the meaning of texts.
75
  One must thus strive to 
balance fairly and thoroughly the analysis of différance with the need for finality that law might 
rightly demand in a given concrete case. In that light, my hermeneutic pragmatism would offer 
the following definition of deconstruction: “the context appropriate search for différance.”  
As we engage in such a search, we must not only remember our conceptual and metaphorical 
flexibilities discussed above but also our restraints discussed in Section IV and Appendix C 
below. 
 
 D. Re-emphasizing Imagination 
 
 Given the freedoms we have in constructing categories and concepts and given the 
openness of thought required for deconstruction as I have pragmatically defined it, hermeneutic 
pragmatism agrees with Richard Rorty that increased imagination fuels “intellectual and moral 
progress.”76 As Rorty notes, imagination is “the ability to redescribe the familiar in unfamiliar 
terms,” it is “the source both of new scientific pictures of the physical universe and the new 
conceptions of possible communities,” and it is “power” that can “make the human future richer 
than the human past.”77 As Rorty also notes, imagination drives the “poetry of justice” needed to 
“break up ‘bad coherence’” of prior bad precedent: thus, Brown effectively proclaimed that “like 
it or not, black children are children too.”78  
                                                 
74
 Given the endless interplay of Derrida’s “difference” and his “deferred,” which “puts off until 
‘later what is presently denied,” see CAHOONE, supra note 69, at 225, one might claim that texts 
are undecidable. In this regard, Feldman contrasts Derrida and Gadamer: like Gadamer (whom I 
discuss in further detail in Section IV-B-3 below), Derrida stresses “that any text or event has 
many potential meanings, many possible truths; no single meaning remains fixed or stable in all 
contexts. . . . Yet, while Gadamer therefore considers the meaning of a text to be inexhaustible, 
Derrida considers it to be undecidable.” FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 18, 
at 34. Feldman humorously notes that “if Gadamer and Derrida were looking at a glass of water, 
Gadamer would probably say that it is half full, while Derrida likely would say it is half empty.” 
Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166, 187 
n.101 (1996).  
75
 See FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 18, at 194 (“Supreme Court justices 
must pronounce the law.”); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 73 (2010) (“One cannot rest content with 
‘deconstructing’ a will to show that it lacks meaning or contains contradictory meanings; one 
needs to decide what the will does and does not do."). 
76
 See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 87 (1999) [hereinafter RORTY, 
PHILOSOPHY]. 
77
 Id. As Hookway similarly notes when discussing Peirce, “It was a mark of the great men of 
science that their guesses were particularly inspired; there are endless passages where [Peirce] 
describes the abductive skills of Kepler and other heroes.” CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEIRCE 225 
(1992).  
78
 See RORTY, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 76, at 99; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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 Brown’s breaking up of the immoral “coherence” of segregating schools in accordance 
with the segregating of trains upheld by Plessy
79
 is, of course, something to celebrate, and 
hermeneutic pragmatism’s recognition that we can change our human concepts and categories 
gives us hope that we are not forever trapped in either immoral coherence or incoherence. This is 
not to say, however, that such change is always easy since, as discussed in Section IV and 
Appendix C below, there can be much pushback in multiple forms to change.  Such pushback, 
however, should not deter us from celebrating the powers and delights of imagination that 
devises the workable or that otherwise causes no harm. In that spirit (and with the knowledge 
that our workable terms define “nature” rather than the reverse), hermeneutic pragmatism sings 
along with William Blake that “Nature has no Outline: but Imagination has. Nature has no Tune: 
but Imagination has!”80 However, again, the pushback discussed in Section IV and Exhibit C 
cautions us that unworkable imagination must not masquerade as workable.  However delightful 
much imagination may be, there are no presidential “magic wands.” 
 
 E. Some Methods of Effecting Change 
 
 How do hermeneutic pragmatists attempt to initiate imaginative change? They can play 
off and work within the conceptual, systemic, semantic lifeworld, and experiential restraints I 
discuss in Section IV and Appendix C below. They can also use Rorty's redescriptive “method” 
which is: 
 
to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of 
linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing 
them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior . . . . This sort of 
philosophy does not work piece by piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing 
thesis after thesis. Rather, it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like "try 
thinking of it this way" . . . [or] “try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions 
by substituting the following new and possibly interesting questions.” . . . [I]t does not 
argue for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent criteria common to the old and new 
language games. For just insofar as the new language really is new, there will be no such 
criteria.
81
 
 
 Of course, hermeneutic pragmatism sympathizes with Rorty here but with, again, the 
further caveat that, as explored in the remainder of this article, we must recognize the various 
forms of pushback against creative change. This caveat leads hermeneutic pragmatism to 
disagree with Rorty's claim that legal theory offers no defense against judges whose imaginations 
                                                 
79
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
80
 WILLIAM BLAKE, “The Ghost of Abel,” in THE COMPLETE POETRY & PROSE OF WILLIAM 
BLAKE 270 (David V. Erdman ed., rev. ed. 2008). My prose translation would of course change 
“Nature” to “the Pre-lingusitic.”  We should also join Blake in rejecting the Age of Reason's 
belief that imagination is “a degenerative malady of the intellect.” S. FOSTER DAMON, A BLAKE 
DICTIONARY: THE IDEAS AND SYMBOLS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 195 (rev. ed. 1988).  
81
 RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 22, at 9.  
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result in “morally appalling” decisions.82 Workable legal theory must also recognize the forms of 
pushback (including moral pushback) discussed in Section IV and Appendix C below.   
 
IV. Making Workable Sense: Law, Fact and Overlapping Semantic and Pre-semantic Restraints 
 
 Having explored many of the freedoms asserted by hermeneutic pragmatism, we must 
now turn to the many restraints also recognized by hermeneutic pragmatism.  I do not claim that 
the restraints surveyed are exhaustive. Additionally, if the devotion to restraint in what follows 
seems to outweigh the devotion to freedom, I plead a justified reaction to the excesses pointed 
out in Section I above and to the exigencies of these times of post-truth claims.  Again, 
hermeneutic pragmatism (along with Blake) unabashedly celebrates the imagination though it 
recognizes the restraints discussed in this Section IV and in Appendix C. 
 
 A. The Pre-semantic 
 
 1. Pure Reference and Pushback 
 
 Hermeneutic pragmatism recognizes the pre-semantic as well as the semantic.  Imagine, 
for example, a blind child who has not yet learned the concept of a cliff. If he walks over the 
edge of a cliff that he cannot see, he will, of course, suffer notwithstanding that he could neither 
see nor articulate the notion of a cliff. In such a case, the child has faced uncategorized or pre-
semantic pushback. (Again, as in Section II-E  hermeneutic pragmatism uses the term “pre-
semantic” only to refer83  without the additional notion of sense discussed in that section.)  The 
pushback of the pre-semantic here no doubt exists. 
 This example of the unfortunate child should also let hermeneutic pragmatism refine 
Rorty's following reflections on Davidson.  According to Rorty: 
 
Davidson's claim that a truth theory for a natural language is nothing more or less than an 
empirical explanation of the causal relations which hold between features of the 
environment and the holding true of sentences, seems to me all the guarantee we need 
that we are, always and everywhere, ‘in touch with the world’. If we have such a 
guarantee, then we have all the insurance we need against ‘relativism’ and ‘arbitrariness’. 
For Davidson tells us that we can never be more arbitrary than the world lets us be. . . . 
These pressures will be described in different ways at different times and for different 
purposes, but they are pressures none the less. 
84
 
 
 If we refine Rorty's language above by substituting “pre-semantic” for both 
“environment” and “world,” we can say that the child encountered a tragedy whose cause lay 
beyond his words, a tragedy which should therefore motivate him (should he survive) to change 
his language and behavior. This “pressure” (to use Rorty’s word) of the pre-semantic should 
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demolish any prior arbitrary faith in the perpetual flat unbrokenness of ground and require new 
words and concepts for the child.   
 Applying all this to the unfortunate child above, he experiences what we would truthfully 
call blindly falling off of a cliff though he would lack such words and notions for the force he 
felt. We can point to real examples, too, where we have felt forces for which we lacked concepts 
or terms.  Victims, for example, were suffering from HIV long before we had such a term.
85
  
Although they and their doctors lacked both a sense and a reference for HIV, they could feel
86
 
the pushback (or “pressure” to use Rorty's term) of the pre-semantic here. They tragically felt 
Gadamer’s point: “that behind all the relativities of language and convention there is something 
in common which is no longer language, but which looks to an ever-possible  
verbalization . . . .”87   
 Of course, “post-truth” people, despite their bluster, also cannot blindly or with eyes wide 
open escape such pre-semantic pushback. If their claims do not work or withstand with the pre-
semantic, they will feel its pushback, too. 
 
 2. The “Huck Finn Problem”88 
 
 As I have explored elsewhere,
89
 feeling plays important roles in cognition beyond that 
just discussed with the unfortunate falling child. In addition to playing “a crucial role in 
expressing the urgency of emotional situations,”90 feelings can often “pick up on something” that 
may not fit or fall under “a conventional rational category” available at the time.91  Feeling, in 
other words, can often detect pushback or pressures (to use Rorty's term again) that language has 
either overlooked, simply gotten wrong, or has not otherwise sufficiently categorized. 
 A classic example from fiction of “picking up on something”92 outside of the linguistic 
categories available to the person at the time is the so-called “Huck Finn Problem.” Huck Finn 
refuses to return a slave even though Huck’s linguistic (including moral) categories of the time 
all tell him that he is doing evil by helping the slave escape.
93
 As Sabine Döring tells us, “It is his 
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sympathy for Jim [the slave] which causes Huck to act . . . though he does not endorse his 
emotion but castigates himself for his weakness.”94  
As Döring also tells us, in our “default” mode we usually “take the representational 
content of our perceptions at face value” even though these perceptions are not always correct.95 
Much like the Müller-Lyer illusion pictured below (where the lines refuse to appear of equal 
length even though they are), Huck’s feelings conflict with his linguistically-affected perceptions 
and understandings of a “straightforward” notion that theft of property (a term then including 
human property) is wrong.
96
  
 
 
 
 Huck’s feelings, however, have alerted him to the “illusion” of error in helping Jim 
escape. No matter how impossible it might have been to see the error in condemning such 
behavior, Huck’s feelings have properly broken the chains of conceptual frameworks that have 
not morally worked and that have otherwise colored his experience.  As discussed in Section IV-
C and Appendix C below on “workability,” I (consistent with Huck’s case) believe that the pre-
semantic pushes back in ways that require refinement of moral as well as other concepts.  
 Such power of pre-semantic pushback or pressure reminds us of the limitation of words 
and should caution “post-truth people” who might believe that freedoms in how we form and 
frame our categories allow us to revel in “nihilism, relativism, irresponsibility, and the like” 
without fear of consequence.  It should also caution judges, lawyers, and law students that 
perhaps something is not quite “right” or workable about their current concepts in play. 
 
 B. Semantic Lifeworlds and the Meaningful 
 
 1. General Overview and Restraints 
 
   Assuming that experience is shaped by language,
97
 hermeneutic pragmatism agrees with 
Putnam that the term “lifeworld” or “Lebenswelt” includes “the world as we actually experience 
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it” and I shall so use the term (usually as “semantic lifeworld”) in this article.98  Consistent with 
my earlier distinction in Section II-E above between the “pre-semantic” and the world as set 
forth in language, I shall therefore use “semantic lifeworld(s)” as a semantic rather than a “pre-
semantic” notion. (That said, and though I also focus in this Section IV on the meaningful--i.e., 
notions having both sense and reference as discussed in Section II-D above--flexible semantic 
lifeworlds must include reference to the pre-semantic that is yet to be given reference or sense or 
both.) As we shall see, any such semantic lifeworld(s) also contain significant restraints that belie 
any notion of hermeneutic pragmatism expounding “nihilism, relativism, irresponsibility, and the 
like.” 
 In defining “semantic lifeworld(s),” hermeneutic pragmatism recognizes that such a 
“semantic lifeworld” or “semantic lifeworlds” include not only non-technical matters of 
experience but the technical as well.
99
  It therefore recognizes that semantic lifeworlds include 
interpretive groups that are “nested” within others so that the American legal community, for 
example, “is surrounded by the political community, social community, and ultimately the entire 
interpretive community of American and perhaps international culture.”100   Such semantic 
lifeworlds are thus complex webs where change generally requires justification acceptable to the 
appropriate members.
101
  For example, a competent lawyer member of such complex webs will 
be wary of claims that a quitclaim deed warrants good title.
102
 
 To explore common semantic lifeworlds and their accompanying restraints in further 
detail, I shall next examine semantic lifeworld restraints of common sense, Gadamer and his 
                                                                                                                                                             
embracing form of the constitution of the world” and on language “depends the fact that man has 
a world at all.” GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 440. “World” is a linguistic 
concept with both sense and reference as these notions are distinguished in Section II-A above. 
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“linguistic constitutions of the world,” restraints of “internal realism” restraints of individual 
concepts, and restraints of applicable implementives.  All such restraints merit careful attention 
in these times of post-truth claims. 
 
 2. “Common Sense” and Semantic Lifeworlds 
 
 We all know that common sense can be wrong--even embarrassingly wrong. For 
example, the philosopher G. E. Moore once claimed, “I know there is a window in this room.” 
Unfortunately for Moore, the curtains in the University of Michigan lecture hall where he was 
speaking had no windows behind them.
103
  
 Despite that embarrassing example, hermeneutic pragmatism also recognizes that 
common sense can be correct as well and can in any event put up formidable resistance across 
semantic lifeworlds. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca capture what we generally mean by such 
common sense: “a series of beliefs which are accepted within a particular society and which the 
members of that society suppose to be shared by every reasonable being.”104 One must bring 
considerable persuasion to counter such “common sense” since one is opposing beliefs presumed 
to be “shared by every reasonable being.”105      
 Given the force of common sense just noted and “conceptions of reason which equate 
reason with common sense,”106 challenging common sense can thus be deemed “absurd.” Of 
course, where one takes a position that will be considered “absurd,” one should be prepared for a 
strong reaction.  The “post-truthful” risk such potential reactions no less than the rest of us. 
Judges, lawyers, and law students should also, of course, be aware of such force. 
 These strong reactions can be multifold. Thomas Reid warns of one sharp “weapon” 
against those who challenge common sense: ridicule, which he notes “cuts with as keen an edge 
as argument.”107 Current rhetoric would agree with such claims of keenness: “The ridiculous is 
what deserves to be greeted by laughter, that laughter which has been designated as ‘exclusive 
laughter’ (rire d’exclusion) . . . .)108  I would translate “rire d’exclusion” more ominously--
and accurately I think--as laughter of expulsion. Such laughter should cut deeply. 
 Additionally, the “post-truthful” should expect other potentially severe reactions when 
they publicly mock or challenge such cherished “common sense” notions as truth and honesty.  
By attacking the cherished, they risk severe public emotional reactions such as public contempt 
(whose prototypical desire in such a case is to ostracize someone seen as unworthy), public 
disgust (whose prototypical desire in such a case is to remove someone seen as contaminating), 
public anger (whose prototypical desire in such a case is to punish someone seen as culpably 
causing wrongful harm), and public hatred (whose prototypical desire in such a case is 
unfortunately to cause pain or harm to someone seen as deserving such pain or harm as a result 
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of evils done).
109
 In questioning the “unquestioned and unquestionable,” one can thus risk such 
fates, among others, as “prison or a mental institution.”110 Again, semantic lifeworlds push back 
here in potentially dire ways against the “post-truthful” as well as the rest of us.  
 This is not to say, of course, that one should always give way in the face of such 
pushback. Where common sense is wrong it should be called out. Those who thought that the 
world was round and not flat, for example, or that the earth courses around the sun rather than 
the reverse absolutely should have fought those battles.  However, in doing so, they would have 
been strategically foolish not to plan for potentially-fierce and cutting pushback. 
 
 3. Gadamer and “Linguistic Constitutions of the World” 
 
 Hermeneutic pragmatism can also learn from Gadamer’s claim that language is “a 
limitless medium that carries everything within it” and his resulting talk of a “linguistic 
constitution of the world” that is “effected by history,” and that provides “an initial 
schematization for all our possibilities of knowing."
111
  Although I would more clearly state that 
there can be various such competing “constitutions” at various levels in any complex society 
(which may or may not include among them any dominant “linguistic constitutions of the 
world”), the metaphor is a useful one for judges, lawyers, and law students who would persuade.  
One must know one’s audience, and to do that one would, of course, want to know the various 
“linguistic constitutions of the world” at play.  
 Though I have celebrated imagination above,
112
 imagination must therefore know that 
each member of its audience “always [has] a world already interpreted, already organized in its 
basic relations”113 and that “we are always already encompassed by the language that is our 
own.”114 Imagination must also understand that prejudices or “fore-understandings”  in such 
“lingustic constitutions” often go unnoticed by the mind and can only be addressed if we bring it 
“before” us and reflect upon it to determine what in the “pre-understanding may be justified from 
and what unjustifiable.”115 Furthermore, “basic prejudices” in such “linguistic constitutions of 
the world” can put up considerable resistance to protect “themselves by claiming self-evident 
certainty.” 116 Gadamer warns us that “one who calls the self-evident into doubt will find the 
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resistance of all practical evidence marshaled against him.”117  Gadamer also warns us that the 
“self-evident” can be extensive: “Long before we understand ourselves through the process of 
self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state 
in which we live.”118  
 Imagination seeking change must therefore have sufficient persuasive means
119
 to counter 
this complex mixture of “linguistic constitutions,” traditions, and prejudices. Thus, Wilson Huhn, 
for example, gives an excellent overview of some basic ways to challenge aspects of legal 
semantic lifeworlds in play by examining and attacking, among other arguments, arguments 
based on precedent, tradition, and policy.
120
  
 Additionally, the person who takes any position must examine her own “linguistic 
constitutions,” “preunderstandings,” and “prejudices.” She must do this not only to withstand 
potential objections others may raise, but also to ensure that she herself really understands what 
she would accomplish.  (Perhaps, for example, her own prejudice blinds her to ways her desires 
actually counter her own self-interest.) This subtlety might well seem lost on the “post-truth” 
speech quoted in Section I above and in Appendix A as well as on Trump supporters whose 
economic or other interests he may not support or may even undermine (such as those of the low 
income voter with pre-existing health conditions who might be unable to obtain healthcare 
coverage if Trump successfully dismantles current health coverage options but who somehow 
suffer under delusions that actually-available coverage is worse than it is.) 
 
 4. “Internal Realism” and Semantic Lifeworlds 
 
 a. Putnam and “Internal Realism” 
 
 Consistent with the notion of “linguistic constitutions of worlds,” Putnam insightfully 
explores what he calls “internal realism” which also provides further pushback in category and 
concept creation and usage.  As Putnam notes: 
 
We can and should insist that some facts are there to be discovered and not legislated by 
us. But this is something to be said when one has adopted a way of speaking, a language, 
a ‘conceptual scheme’. To talk of ‘facts’ without specifying the language to be used is to 
talk of nothing; the word ‘fact’ no more has its use fixed by Reality Itself than does the 
word ‘exist’ or the word object’.121 
 
 Thus, according to Putnam, “There are ‘external facts’, and we can say what they are. 
What we cannot say-- because it makes no sense-- is what the facts are independent of all 
conceptual choices.”122 Put another way, 
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The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed 
ourselves with the language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose language for 
us to speak. Only other human beings can do that.
123
 
 
Consistent with this, Putnam claims that 
 
Internal realism [i.e., the sort of realism described by Putnam above after we have 
adopted a ‘way of speaking”’ or a ‘conceptual scheme’] says that we don't know what we 
are talking about when we talk about ‘things in themselves.’124  
 
Instead, the internal realist  
 
is willing to think of reference as internal to ‘texts’ (or theories), provided we recognize 
that there are better and worse ‘texts.’ ‘Better’ and ‘worse’ may themselves depend on 
our historical situation and our purposes; there is no notion of a God's-Eye View of Truth 
here . . . . 
125
  
 
(I shall explore this notion of “better” and “worse” in Section IV-C and Appendix C on 
workability below, which Section IV-C and Appendix C will also explore the pushback of the 
pre-semantic as well as the semantic.) 
 Putnam’s “internal realism” can therefore also embrace a form of common sense by 
claiming that within “conceptual schemes” or semantic lifeworlds: 
 
There are tables and chairs and ice cubes. There are also electrons and space-time regions 
and prime numbers and people who are a menace to world peace and moments of beauty 
and transcendence and many other things.
126
 
 
 Through focusing on things posited in the “conceptual scheme” or semantic lifeworld, 
Putnam’s internal realism can therefore take “our familiar commonsense scheme, as well as our 
scientific and artistic and other schemes, at face value, without helping itself to the notion of the 
thing ‘in itself.’”127  Such internal realism can, in other words, linguistically concentrate on 
objects existing in and described by the “conceptual schemes” or semantic lifeworlds rather than 
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on some unfathomable thing-in-itself lying beyond the realm of experience.
128
  Thus, what we 
meaningfully talk about is within a conceptual scheme or semantic lifeworld, as discussed in 
Sections II-C and II-D above and in this Section IV. Thus, “what is and is not physically 
possible” within a conceptual scheme or semantic lifeworld would not be an “external distinction 
imposed by philosophers” but “a distinction internal to the physical theory itself."129  Such a 
conceptual scheme therefore also pushes back albeit internally.  
 As a part of such internal pushback, Putnam sensibly notes that our conceptual schemes 
set out the requirements for truth and verification
130
 and that science and other inquiry must 
therefore meet such requirements.  In evaluating such internal realism’s requirements for truth 
and verification, the typical person puts powerful stock in her five senses as framed by language.  
Such senses verify to her that tables, ice cubes, and chairs exist. Thus, a “post-truth” person 
cannot persuasively obliterate existing tables, ice cubes, and chairs by simply denying their 
existence.  Nor can he do the reverse and generate (by magic wand or otherwise) an inaugural or 
other crowd or fantasy that did not exist.
131
  
 
 b. Hart and Law’s “Internal Points of View” 
 
 Similarly addressing internal realism in the law, H.L.A. Hart notes that people may 
regard the law either externally or internally: 
 
. . .  [I]t is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does 
not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as 
guides to conduct. We make all these respectively the ‘external and the ‘internal points of 
view’. 132 
 
 Those who take the internal point of view “manifest their acceptance of them as 
governing rules” and will use such phrases as “‘It is the law that  . . .’, which we may find on the 
lips not only of judges, but of ordinary men living under a legal system, when they identify a 
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given rule of the system.’”133 Those who take the external point of view, however, will instead 
manifest their non-acceptance by such phrases as “‘In England they recognize as law . . . 
whatever the Queen and Parliament enacts. . . .’”134  
 Of course, severe potential pushback awaits “post-truth” people who flaunt a legal system 
internalized by the “bulk of society.”135   Such potential pushback is endless and therefore well 
beyond specific discussion in this article. I shall therefore just highlight a few aspects which 
“post-truth” people flaunt at their peril. 
 First, to the extent “post-truth people” are lawyers (I, of course, shudder at such a 
possibility), such people should be aware of Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 
8.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct expressly provides: “It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to [among other things] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation.”136  
 Comment 7 to Rule 8.4 further provides that “Lawyers holding public office assume legal 
responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens.”137 "Post-truth" lawyers (again I shudder at 
the possibility of such lawyers) serving as public officials thus face heightened pushback.  And 
whether or not they are lawyers, “post-truth” public officials in their “post-truth” mindset are 
apparently blind to the very real internal restraints of the law running from systematic checks 
such as applicable grounds for removal or impeachment to criminal prosecution. Those in 
elected, appointed, or hired positions of public power, of course, also face the ballot box, 
impeachment, and termination for cause as the case may be. 
 As long as legal rules and principles
138
 are internalized by the “bulk of society,”139 risks 
imposed by such restraints are formidably real. They provide further and potentially severe 
pushback on any “post-truth” view that we live in an era of “nihilism, relativism, irresponsibility, 
and the like.”140  
 
 5. Specific Concepts and Semantic Lifeworlds 
 
 a. Specific Concepts Themselves 
 
 Further exploring applicable restraints on the “post-truthful,” perhaps some of the most 
obvious restraints we encounter are in the specific concepts that we use. For example, in a 
conveyance of Blackacre to another, I might in a deed warrant and represent the property to be 
rectangular and containing 20,000 square feet.  Having done that, subsequently denying that the 
property has four corners and subsequently claiming that the property actually contains only 
15,000 square feet, for example, will create pushback because the concept of a rectangle and the 
expressly stated number of square feet push back. 
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 That is not to say that I cannot attempt to tackle such restraint by reframing or otherwise 
modifying my concepts as discussed in Section III above, but I must nonetheless recognize the 
pushback of such restraint. For example, I might claim that the “corners” of the “rectangle” 
comprising Blackacre are misshaped in such and such a way that results in Blackacre having 
more than four “angles.”  I might, for example, also try to claim that the original measurement of 
20,000 square feet was a surveyor's mistake. I might do all of these things but in doing them I 
have changed what I originally said and would thus effectively be conceding a breach of 
warranty and a misrepresentation as to Blackacre.  Though we create concepts like Blackacre, 
such concepts can thus take on a life of their own that we can no longer fully control.   
 As Gadamer would no doubt remind us here, taking up a word can be more than taking 
up “some arbitrary tool which can be thrown in a corner if it doesn't do the job,” but instead can 
involve “a line of thought that comes from afar and reaches on beyond . . . .”141  Such reaching 
“beyond” also leads us to the pushback of conceptual presuppositions and entailments discussed 
below. 
 
 b. Specific Concepts and Presuppositions
142
 
 
 Additional conceptual pushback occurs in the form of conceptual or semantic 
presuppositions.
143
  For example, if a “post-truth” person responds to a traffic citation by saying 
“my driving during the day with a malfunctioning taillight was hardly dangerous,” that answer 
must presuppose “a malfunctioning taillight” or he would not be speaking consistently.  A “post-
truth” person could of course realize the tactical error he had made and try to deny that he meant 
to admit the malfunctioning taillight.  Unfortunately for him, he would likely find that that horse 
had too far left the barn.  
 Such “semantic presuppositions” and related stasis theory (noted below in this section) 
can prove much trickier than the previous example might suggest. For example, in a paternity 
proceeding an alleged father has denied paternity.  In a hearing, counsel for the mother claims 
that the man “has treated his son horribly.”  The alleged father responds: “That is not true!  I 
have done him no harm!”  Does negating just the proposition as to horrible treatment concede 
paternity?  One must, of course, tread carefully here, and this applies to the “post-truthful” no 
less than to the rest of us. 
 Such presuppositional pushback ties into rhetorical stasis (or issue) theory which 
recognizes a progressive and straightforward presuppositional issue line: (1) Sitne? (“Does it 
exist?”)  (2) Quid sit? (“What is it?”) and Quale sit? (“What [quality] of thing is it?”)144  For 
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 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 552.  
142
 Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law’s “Way of Words”: Pragmatics and Textualist Error, 49 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 221 (2016) [hereinafter Lloyd, Way of Words].  I have not addressed here 
pragmatic presuppositions which can be found at id. at 285. 
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require or involve necessarily as an antecedent condition.”  Presuppose, AMERICAN HERITAGE 
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more formally to involve “a proposition whose truth is necessary for either the truth or falsity of 
another statement.  Thus if p presupposes q, q must be true for p to be either true or false.” See 
Presupposition, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2016). 
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 See LANHAM, supra note 39, at 93. 
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example, to ask what something is (such as a tree growing in a park) on its face concedes the 
tree’s existence.  To ask whether that species of oak is sturdy, on its face concedes that the tree is 
an oak and that it exists.  Given such a stasis line, even a “post-truth” person must carefully 
understand what she is conceding when she responds, for example, that she was right to cut 
down that very oak tree in the park because she did not believe it was sturdy.  By making a 
“Quale sit” assertion, she has effectively conceded the “Sitne?” and the “Quid sit?” questions, 
i.e., whether she did something and whether it was cutting down that oak in the park.
145
 This 
stasis line applies to the “post-truthful” no less than to the rest of us. 
 
 c. Specific Concepts and Entailments
146
 
 
 Further pushing back on the “post-truthful,” propositions also entail147 other propositions.  
For example, “My dog, Lucky, is a boxer mix” unavoidably entails that “Lucky is an animal.”148 
It also entails that Lucky is of the genus Canis, the family Canidae, the Order Carnivora, the 
Class Mammilia, the Phylum Chordata, and the Kingdom Animalia,
149
 even if the speaker 
(including even the “post-truth” speaker) has never heard all those terms and cannot have meant 
to use or mean them.  The “post-truth” speaker no less than any other speaker is unavoidably 
caught up in such an extended web of expanding meaning by the very use of language itself. A 
“post-truth” person who claims that Lucky is a dog but not of the genus Canis should at the very 
least expect ridicule from ordinary audiences with access to a dictionary or the internet. 
 
 6. Implementives and Semantic lifeworlds
150
 
 
Qui vult finem vult media.
151
 
 
 A further category of additional meaning (and attendant pushback) flowing from a 
speaker’s use of concepts includes what I have called (for want of a better term) 
“implementives.”152  Implementives recognize (where appropriate) the maxim “Qui vult finem 
                                                 
145
 Id.  
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 This Section draws from Lloyd, Way of Words, supra note 142, at 286-287. 
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 I accept Cruse’s definition of “entailment”: “To say that Proposition P entails Proposition Q 
means that the truth of Q follows logically and inescapably from the truth of P, and the falsity of 
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 Canis lupus familiaris, 1 MAMMAL SPECIES OF THE WORLD: A TAXONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHIC 
REFERENCE 2142 (Don Wilson & DeeAnn Reeder eds., 3rd ed. 2005). 
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Rhetoric, 6 ACTA IURIDICA OLOMUCENSIA 9 (2011) [hereinafter Lloyd, Let’s Skill All the 
Lawyers]. 
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 JAMES T. BRETZKE, CONSECRATED PHRASES:  A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY: LATIN 
EXPRESSIONS COMMONLY FOUND IN THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 199 (3d ed. 2013). I would 
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vult medi”153 which I would translate as “one who wishes the end wishes the means.”  As we 
shall see, the “post-truthful” face no less applicable implementive pushback than the rest of us. 
 
 a. Micro-Implementives 
 
 Consistent with application of the above means-end maxim in appropriate cases, “micro-
implementives” cover the means of carrying out, applying, or enforcing specific directions, rules, 
agreements, or any other specific matters where desired ends suggest using reasonable means.   
To recognize a meaningful right in an enforceable contract, for example, is to grant some way to 
implement that right even where the applicable contract may not specifically address 
implementation.
154
   
 To take another example, hiring a lawyer to consummate a lease can convey “implied” 
authority beyond that expressly granted since, of course, the client presumably wills by the 
engagement the reasonable means to effectuate such a lease.
155
  Because of the considerable 
development of, and literature on, the law of remedies and agency, for example, I shall not 
address legal micro-implementives further than to note that such remedies and implied agency 
expand meaning and provide attendant pushback.
156
  
 
 b. “Macro-Implementives” 
 
 i. Argumentation: Habermas 
 
 In addition to the micro-implementive examples given above involving the means of 
carrying out, applying, or enforcing specific directions, rules, agreements, or any other specific 
matters, “to will the end is to will the reasonable means” can also apply to implementing 
disciplines or general types of activities themselves.  As these sorts of implementives can more 
broadly implement the very existence of such disciplines or activities, I shall refer to them as 
                                                 
153
 BRETZKE, supra note 181.   
154
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344 et seq. (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(broadly addressing remedies); U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711 (AM. LAW INSTITUTE & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1977) (addressing sellers’ and buyers’ remedies in general in contracts for the sale of 
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 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has actual 
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acts necessary or incidental to the achieving the principal’s objectives, as the agent reasonably 
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 See, e.g., DAN R. DOBBS & CAPRICE ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES (3
rd
 ed. 2017); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 2006). For a potential parallel in the area of 
medicine, see PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 41, at 127 (“if someone is declared 
to be suffering from a particular disease, this involves, at least partially, an advance judgment of 
the treatment that will be applied to him.”) 
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“macro-implementives.”157  Applicable macro-implementives also push back against the “post-
truthful” no less than against the rest of us. 
 For example, Habermas sees arguments as “processes of reaching understanding that are 
ordered in such a way that proponents and opponents . . . can test validity claims that have 
become problematic.”158 He believes that accomplishing this requires “pragmatic presuppositions 
of a special form of interaction, namely everything necessary for a search for truth organized in 
the form of a competition.”159 Such “pragmatic presuppositions” would thus include: (1) “Every 
speaker may assert only what he really believes,” and (2) “A person who disputes a proposition 
or norm not under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.”160  Given human 
limits of knowledge and power, these “pragmatic presuppositions” seem on their face among the 
reasonably-necessary means to the broader end of having such argumentation.
161
   
 However, hermeneutic pragmatism would use the term “implementive” here rather than 
“pragmatic presupposition.”   “Implementive” more directly suggests required means to an end.  
Additionally, “implementive” avoids confusion with the notion of formal presupposition 
discussed above.
162
 Furthermore, “implementive” avoids confusion with “pragmatic 
presuppositions” in discourse such as, for example, where speakers in a group know that the term 
“victim” in their discourse means one of their whiny neighbors rather than a real victim.163 In 
any event, and however termed, such macro-implementives push back against those who would 
lie. 
 
 ii. Law: Fuller and Beyond 
 
 As a powerful pushback against the “post-truthful,” one can also step back and more 
generally explore macro-implementives for the very rule of law itself, that is, for “[t]he 
                                                 
157
 A distinction between the two sorts of implementives seems required for further reasons.  
Micro-implementives can be seen as perhaps more analogous to implication (as in the case of 
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true or false.” See Presupposition, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (3d ed. 2016). 
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supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power.”164   Where we have such rule of law in any 
effective sense, we must of course have the means to implement such rule of law not only in the 
“micro” sense of, for example, having injunctive remedies to enforce restraining orders in 
specific cases or providing a seller with meaningful remedies in the event of a buyer’s breach.  
We must also recognize reasonable, general means necessary for implementing the rule of law 
itself in light of the limitations of human knowledge and power. In light of their implementive 
function for rule of law itself, I shall also call these reasonable implementive means “macro-
implementives.”  
 Although Lon Fuller unfortunately uses phrases such as “the inner morality of the 
law,”165 he has famously partially explored what I would like to clarify as macro-implementives, 
a clarification for the “post-truthful” as well as for the rest of us.  Fuller recognizes that a legal 
system’s rules “normally serve the primary purpose of setting the citizen’s relations with other 
citizens. . . .”166  To that end, Fuller recognizes that legal rules cannot work if they are (1) ad hoc, 
(2) not publicized, (3) retroactively applied in abusive fashion, (4) not understandable, (5) 
contradictory, (6) otherwise beyond a party’s power to perform, (7) changed with disorienting 
frequency, or (8) administered in a way that differs from their announcement.
167
  
 Each one of these eight points recognizes on its face that human beings as non-
omniscient, non-omnipotent, or both, cannot be expected to follow rules which do not have these 
characteristics. How can a person of limited knowledge and power embrace and follow, for 
example, unknown, impossible, incomprehensible, or incomprehensibly-administered rules?  At 
least where we would have rule of law, macro-implementives thus push back on the post-truthful 
as well as the rest of us.  For example, if we want people to drive no faster than fifty miles per 
hour on a certain road, we have to give coherent and consistent notice.  We cannot achieve that 
speed limit by giving no notice or by speaking of different limits from moment to moment. For 
those interested in exploring each of these implementives in more detail (as well as three more 
that I propose), I further explore in Appendix B eleven macro-implementives related to the rule 
of law as well as alternative forms of pushback where we would have “rules” but not rule of law. 
 
 C. Pre-semantic and Semantic lifeworld Workability Restraints
168
 
 
 In light of the multiple forms of pushback discussed above, if we are to claim that our 
legal or other concepts and categories have a force beyond mere utterance, we must show that 
such concepts and categories both effectively stand within our applicable linguistic semantic 
lifeworlds and effectively withstand the pre-semantic.  These are the forms of “stand” we 
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 Rule of Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Consistent with this definition, 
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seek, not illusory Cartesian notions of “standing” or “building” on “indubitable” foundations 
existing apart from the categories we create.
169
   
 Hermeneutic pragmatism thus forges categories meant to “work” with both the linguistic 
and with the pre-semantic.  Determining such pre-semantic and semantic lifeworld “workability” 
involves examining and weighing in specific cases a number of factors (in some cases 
overlapping). These factors include assessing such categories in terms of their accuracy of 
prediction, their coherence with semantic lifeworld facts and values, and their coherence with 
any applicable precedent.  These factors also include weighing the effects of any pushback of the 
pre-semantic as in the case of the Huck Finn example discussed above. I have set out the 
foregoing and other workability factors in more detail in Appendix C. The post-truthful spurn 
such critical workability analysis at their peril. 
 
V. Hermeneutic Pragmatism’s “Eunomia” Rather Than “Hercules” as                                                                          
Judge
170
 
 
 A. Eunomia’s Qualifications and Practice 
 
 In the context of the law, how should we go about “workably” weaving together 
hermeneutic pragmatism’s insights of freedom and restraint that we have now discussed? Having 
seen that semantic lifeworlds are linguistic constructs, we should look to those who are best 
suited to grasp and apply the senses and references of the semantic lifeworlds in play. The 
linguistic nature of semantic lifeworlds in play thus requires persons with an excellent grasp of 
linguistics and philosophy of language.  Additionally, given the freedoms and restraints that we 
have discussed as well as the need for judgments that cohere with “the collectivity of 
experience’s demands, nothing being omitted,” 171 hermeneutic pragmatism requires persons who 
grasp the force of all applicable forms of pushback discussed above including the moral. 
 Seeking such persons, hermeneutic pragmatism would therefore turn to reasonable
172
 and 
moral judges not only excellently versed
173
 in legal theory and legal practice,
174
 but also in 
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 See René Descartes, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 128, 129 (3d ed. 2016) 
(“Descartes’s theory of knowledge starts with the quest for certainty, for an indubitable starting-
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linguistics, philosophy of language, and the pragmatic theory of meaning discussed in this 
article.  Since language involves the use of signs,
175
 such reasonable and moral judges should 
also be excellently versed in semiotics
176
 (including pragmatics
177
).  Furthermore, since 
workability requires broad coherence across semantic lifeworlds, such judges should also be 
excellently versed in the humanities
178
 and be otherwise excellently capable of grasping the 
matters of semantic lifeworlds in play. 
 For at least two reasons, hermeneutic pragmatism would not choose non-judicial role 
models for interpreting text or other aspects of legal semantic lifeworlds.
179
  Not only do judges 
review matters of law and fact,
180
 judges must also comply with the rules of judicial and 
professional conduct
181
 and would thus be bound by appropriate impartiality between the parties 
and by other standards not binding upon non-lawyer readers.  
 For ease of reference, I would call a judge with the above qualifications “Eunomia” 
(whether she judges alone or in a panel of other Eunomias). I name such a model human judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
pushback discussed above. See Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
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“Eunomia” because her namesake Eunomia is the goddess of “Good Order,” sister of Dike 
(goddess of Justice) and Eirene (goddess of Peace), and daughter of Themis (goddess of “Divine 
Law”).182 What better name for a judge of workable order of “the collectivity of experience’s 
demands, nothing being omitted”?183   
 Rather than impossible fictions such as Dworkin’s “superhuman judge” Hercules,184 
hermeneutic pragmatism thus chooses a human model because hermeneutic pragmatism must 
have workability (including plausibility).  The “superhuman” is beyond us and is therefore 
unworkable (and implausible). Instead, hermeneutic pragmatism more workably requires the 
human qualities of reasonableness, honesty, appropriate impartiality, an excellent education in 
the fields noted above, and excellent abilities of grasping matters in play.
185
  It therefore 
“classically” corrects Dworkin’s “Hercules” with its own more suitable “Eunomia.”  
 That said, “Eunomia” or “Good Order”186 does not mean “Always One Workable Order” 
or “Never a Workable Dissent.” Just as Eunomias might ultimately see a particular painting of 
Schroeder’s stairs in Section III-A-2 above running in opposite directions, such Eunomias might 
of course honestly, impartially, reasonably, skillfully, and otherwise thoroughly weigh applicable 
workability factors including applicable factors and elements of particular cases or controversies 
and reach different but equally-workable conclusions. For example, one can imagine a statute 
which reads “All drivers going in the same direction must drive on the same side of the road.” 
Without more, on the very face of the statute, one Eunomia might workably rule that drivers 
must drive on the right side of the road while another might workably rule that drivers must drive 
on the left.  
 Workability does not prohibit this difference.  Rather, workability requires a legal system 
that honestly recognizes and workably anticipates such potential difference.  A workable legal 
system in such a case could, of course, use a panel of three judges or some other method that 
would break or prohibit the tie (including seating only one Eunomia as judge). 
 
 B. Eunomia and the Foreign Corporation
187
 
 
 How might a single Eunomia go about deciding a particular case more complex than the 
road case above?  Take, for example, a case involving Acme Corporation as defendant where 
Eunomia must apply the following state statute which no courts have previously interpreted: 
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“Courts of this state have personal jurisdiction only over persons or entities having a presence 
within this state.”  Acme Corporation underwrites and sells insurance, is incorporated in another 
state, has its corporate headquarters in yet another state, has ten employees who work from home 
in Eunomia’s state, such ten employees sell insurance for Acme in Eunomia’s state, and Acme 
Corporation has been sued for breach of such an insurance contract sold in Eunomia’s state.  
Eunomia must determine whether the courts of her state have personal jurisdiction over Acme 
Corporation under the above statute. 
 In interpreting and applying the statute, Eunomia first looks at the statute and then looks 
for any judicial interpretation of the statute. Discovering the lack of precedent in her state, she 
returns to the statute and focuses upon “persons or entities” and “having a presence within this 
state.”  She focuses on these phrases because she understands that the statute will not apply if 
corporations are not “persons or entities" and if they lack a “presence within the state."   
 Focusing on such terms, she also recognizes that such phrases and their underlying 
concepts push back as we have discussed above and that any reasonable decision she makes must 
therefore recognize such pushback. However, she also recognizes that such terms as “entity” and 
“presence” have broad scope and will not simply dictate an answer here in any formalist fashion.  
She also recognizes that these terms are used within the context of broader legal and other 
semantic lifeworlds (including a statutory scheme that must have some reasonable purpose if it is 
not to be irrational law).  She therefore knows that she must give these terms a meaning that 
works within the context of such legal and other semantic lifeworlds.  
 That the corporation is an “entity” gives her little initial difficulty. In common language 
use, that term includes “an organization (as a business or governmental unit) that has an identity 
separate from those of its members.”188  The term “presence,” however, is not so simple.  She 
determines that “presence” typically means “the fact or condition of being present.”189 She next 
determines that the two most-likely applicable ordinary language senses of “present” are “now 
existing or in progress” or “being in view or at hand.”190  Neither definition alone resolves the 
matter because they neither tell her how nor where a corporation should be considered either 
“existing or in progress” or “being in view or at hand.” In fact, the “easy” definition of “entity” 
potentially injects a problem here because it parses between an organization and its members. 
Taking this literally, would not the ten employees (or “members”) be irrelevant to her 
jurisdictional considerations since they are by definition parsed from the organization itself? 
 Eunomia does not let herself become trapped by this last question. (Nor does she let 
herself become trapped by metaphysical questions of whether a corporation can literally exist in 
any of the fifty states in the way a physical object such as a tree can exist.
191
)  Instead, she 
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 See Cohen, supra note 15, at 810 (“Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it 
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understands that “present” and “presence” can have multiple meanings as discussed above that 
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understands that her solution must work broadly in light of the legal and other semantic 
lifeworlds in play (including a statutory scheme that must have some reasonable purpose if it is 
not to be irrational law).    
 In seeking such broad workability, she explores ways in which the corporation might 
make itself “at hand” within her state. (She does not focus on “being in view” since she believes 
that one must be “in view” in some sense if one is “at hand”--one must be findable to be at 
hand.) Could “being at hand” include having ten in-state employees who sell Acme’s insurance 
from their homes?   In answering this question, Eunomia recognizes, again, that she is operating 
within the contexts of broad legal and other semantic lifeworlds (including a statutory scheme 
that must have some reasonable purpose if it is not to be irrational law).  As such, she asks 
herself what works best here within “the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being 
omitted.”192  Such a question raises sub-questions such as how much “at hand” do ten in-state 
employees make the corporation, how difficult and unjust would it be to require plaintiffs to 
bring their action in another state, and how difficult and unjust would it be to require the 
corporation to defend an action in a state where it has ten employees?
193
  Excellently exploring 
and answering such questions should lead Eunomia to an answer that results in the requisite good 
order.  That is, of course, the best that we can expect of her.  
 Since Eunomia’s detailed explorations here could fill a law review article in itself, I shall 
go no further into the weeds of her inquiries, frames, and decisions. Instead, I shall end with the 
point that she proceeds in a fashion that recognizes both framing flexibility and real restraints on 
what she can workably do. I shall also end by noting that one cannot rule out the possibility of 
another Eunomia excellently reaching an equally-workable but different result. That, too, would 
be the best we could expect of her in a world possibly permitting equally-workable alternative 
solutions. Of course, “equally-workable” is the key here--such a different Eunomia could not 
acceptably provide (whether under cover of “magic wands,” putative formalism, or otherwise) 
any different answer unless it is equally workable. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Having now explored the freedoms and restraints of hermeneutic pragmatism, how might 
lawyers or others use such hermeneutic pragmatism to engage “post-truth” or formalist errors?  
In his RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC, historian Keith Thomas touches on the daunting 
challenge here:  
 
It is a feature of many systems of thought, and not only primitive ones, that they possess 
a self-confirming character. Once their initial premises are accepted, no subsequent 
discovery will shake the believer's faith, for he can explain it away in terms of the 
existing system. Neither will his convictions be weakened by the failure of some accepted 
                                                                                                                                                             
can avoid such “needle” debates. She also understands, as discussed in Section III-A above, that 
we can also speak metaphorically. 
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ritual to accomplish its desired end, for this too can be accounted for. Such systems of 
belief possess a resilience which makes them virtually immune to external argument.
194
 
 
 Where legal minds face such “systems of belief [that] possess a resilience which makes 
them virtually immune to external argument,” they can attempt to use Rorty's redescription 
approach discussed above in hopes that believers in the other system will be intrigued and 
thereby converted by the appeal of the redescription if not by the argument of the redescription.  
Again, Rorty's method is to:  
 
redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of 
linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing 
them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior . . . . This sort of 
philosophy does not work piece by piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing 
thesis after thesis. Rather, it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like "try 
thinking of it this way" . . . [or] "try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions 
by substituting the following new and possibly interesting questions" . . . . It does not 
argue for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent criteria, and to the old and new 
language games. For just insofar as the new language really is new, there will be no such 
criteria.
195
 
 
 Additionally, legal minds can try to invoke the pushback and pressures of the pre-
semantic, of the semantic lifeworlds in play (including their concepts, implementives, and other 
forces), and can hopefully otherwise enlighten the otherwise recalcitrant believers on the external 
and internal “workability” of belief systems in play.   
 Should this not work, legal minds can try to remind erroneous “post-truth” or formalist 
champions of the ridicule they might expect (including the ridicule that excludes).
196
  Legal 
minds can also especially remind the “post-truthful” of potentially worse.  To the extent the 
“post-truthful” publicly mock or challenge such cherished notions as truth and honesty, they risk 
severe public emotional reactions such as public contempt (whose prototypical desire, again, is 
to ostracize someone seen as unworthy), public disgust (whose prototypical desire, again, is to 
remove someone seen as contaminating), public anger (whose prototypical desire, again, is to 
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punish someone seen as culpably causing wrongful harm), and public hatred (whose 
prototypical desire, again, is to cause pain or harm to someone seen as deserving such pain or 
harm as a result of evils done).
197
 If “post-truth” people can be reached in no other way, perhaps 
these last messages can resonate with them.
198
 
 Should all these specific persuasive efforts fail, “post-truth” and formalist folk must 
nonetheless navigate both the pre-semantic and the semantic lifeworlds that buffet them. They 
turn blind eyes to such forces at their peril. 
 And what more can legal minds with eyes wide open do?  They can seize the freedoms 
discussed above and unleash their imaginations to do the workably good and even the workably 
wonderful.
199
  They can hold accountable those who would do the unworkable including evil 
(which never works in the broad sense discussed above). They can serve as (and seek out) 
Eunomias and other role models who would also do the workably good or even the workably 
wonderful.  They can also demand a renewal of ceremonial rhetoric that frequently celebrates 
and instructs us in the better things that we do, that “strengthens the disposition toward action by 
increasing adherence to the values it lauds.”200  
 As to the last point, judges, lawyers, and law students should thoroughly lament the 
current “lack of understanding” of ceremonial rhetoric.201 They should remember how Simon 
Weil once reflected on what more of such rhetoric by French people in London might have done 
to impassion resistance among the occupied French during the Second World War.  They should 
remember how Weil’s possible means of rousing those back in France included 
 
expression, either officially or under official sanction, of some of the thoughts which, 
before ever being publicly expressed, were already in the hearts of the people, or in the 
hearts of certain active elements in the nation . . . . If one hears this thought expressed 
publicly by some other person, and especially by someone whose words are listened to 
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with respect, its force is increased a hundred-fold and can sometimes bring about an inner 
transformation.
202
  
 
One struggles to find more moving words than these on the powers of rhetoric’s third branch203 
and its utility in rousing the best in us.
204
   
 Judges, lawyers, and law students (along with Eunomia) should thus celebrate 
hermeneutic pragmatism’s demands for the workably good both for the pleasure and the 
instruction that such celebration brings. Hermeneutic pragmatism’s celebration of the 
imagination and its honest recognition that categories come from us (while at the same time 
categories also give us “us”) spurs on more conceptual refinement and progress.   
 That said, hermeneutic pragmatism’s recognition of the many restraints discussed above 
should both temper the “post-truthful” (including their claims of “magic wands”) as well as the 
slippery-slope fears of “formalists” who would otherwise be open to imagine and strive for the 
workably better.  
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Appendix A 
 
 Further “Post-Truth” Claims of the “Powerful” or “Influential” 
 
Kellyanne Conway (counselor to President Trump) 
 
1) Discussing with Chuck Todd the size of the crowd at Trump’s inauguration: “Don't be so 
overly dramatic about it, Chuck. What-- You're saying it's a falsehood. And they're giving 
Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative facts to that. But the point remains--”205 
 
2) Discussing with Norah O’Donnell the reference to “alternative facts”: “Well, it was 
alternative information and additional facts . . . . And that got conflated. But, you know, 
respectfully, Norah, I see mistakes on TV every single day and people just brush them off. 
Everybody thinks it’s just so funny that the wrong—the wrong movie was, you know, 
heralded as the winner of the Oscars.”206  
 
3) Olivia Nuzzi’s account of her interview with Conway: “Of course, to hear Conway tell 
it, nothing that nefarious is going on at all. She shrugs when asked about the inaccurate 
things she’s said. The Bowling Green Massacre? She meant to say ‘Bowling Green 
masterminds,’ she told me, referring to the would-be terrorists who were apprehended 
before they staged an attack. And alternative facts? ‘Two plus two is four. Three plus one is 
four. Partly cloudy, partly sunny. Glass half full, glass half empty. Those are alternative 
facts,’ she said, further defining the infamous phrase as ‘additional facts and alternative 
information.’207  
 
Scottie Nell Hughes (political commentator) 
 
Discussing “facts” with Diane Rehm on 11/30/16: “And so one thing that has been 
interesting this entire campaign season to watch is that people that say facts are facts, they're 
not really facts. Everybody has a way, it's kind of like looking at ratings or looking at a glass 
of half-full water. Everybody has a way of interpreting them to be the truth or not true. 
There's no such thing, unfortunately, anymore of facts. And so Mr. Trump's tweet amongst a 
certain crowd, a large -- a large part of the population, are truth. When he says that millions 
of people illegally voted, he has some -- in his -- amongst him and his supporters, and people 
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believe they have facts to back that up. Those that do not like Mr. Trump, they say that those 
are lies, and there's no facts to back it up.” 208  
                                                 
208
 The Diane Rehm Show: How Journalists Are Rethinking Their Role Under a Trump 
Presidency, NPR (Nov. 30, 2016) (transcript available at https://dianerehm.org/shows/2016-11-
30/how-journalists-are-rethinking-their-role-under-a-trump-presidency).  
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Appendix B 
 
More on Macro-Implementives and the Rule of Law 
 
 Although Lon Fuller unfortunately uses phrases such as “the inner morality of the 
law,”209 he has famously partially explored what I would like to clarify for the “post-truthful” 
and others as macro-implementives.  Again, Fuller recognizes that a legal system’s rules 
“normally serve the primary purpose of setting the citizen’s relations with other citizens. . . .”210  
To that end, Fuller recognizes that rules (whatever specific subject matter they may address) 
cannot work if they are (1) ad hoc, (2) not publicized, (3) retroactively applied in abusive 
fashion, (4) not understandable, (5) contradictory, (6) otherwise beyond a party’s power to 
perform, (7) changed with disorienting frequency, or (8) administered in a way that differs from 
their announcement.
211
  
 Turning to Fuller’s first point, to the extent rules can be ad hoc, we are not omniscient 
and therefore cannot obey rules before they are made. A macro-implementive against the ad hoc 
thus pushes back. Fuller’s first point here is also arguably definitional: what is ad hoc is arguably 
not a rule. To the extent this point is also definitional, it would have the definitional or 
conceptual pushback in the sense discussed in Section IV-B-5-a above.  The remaining seven of 
Fuller’s eight points all expressly turn on ways that rules can fail given our human limitations.  
That is, they all involve a rule-related implementive principle that when a speaker (such as a 
sovereign or other rule maker) promulgates a rule that he wishes others to follow, such a wish on 
its face suggests recognizing as well the means to achieve that rule so long as such means are not 
inconsistent with other higher rules the speaker wishes to be followed.   
Turning to Fuller’s second point, we are not, again, omniscient and therefore cannot 
recognize and obey a rule which we cannot know.  Macro-implementives therefore demand 
publication of rules to be followed. Such demand is not a “morality” of the law, at least not in 
any ordinary sense of the term.
212
  It is instead a facilitating rule required to make the rule 
maker’s specific rule feasible in light of human limitations and is therefore (whether initially 
expressly recognized by the rule maker or not) a necessary adjunct of any sincere and realistic 
desire that a specific rule be followed. This macro-implementive thus also pushes back.  
Turning to Fuller’s third point, our lack of omniscience similarly demands caution with 
respect to retroactive rules since we would lack notice of retroactivity at the time we act.
213
  We 
could also frame this in terms of lack of omnipotence: we lack the power to travel back in time to 
act in accordance with a retroactive rule.  In either case, again, the demand for caution here is not 
a “morality” of the law, at least not in any ordinary sense of the term.  It is instead, again, a 
facilitating rule required to make the rule maker’s specific rule feasible in light of human 
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limitations and is therefore (whether initially expressly recognized by the rule maker or not) a 
necessary adjunct of any sincere and realistic desire that a specific rule be followed. This macro-
implementive thus also pushes back.  
Turning to Fuller’s fourth point, we again are not omniscient and therefore cannot obey 
rules that we cannot understand.  If the rule maker truly desires that we follow his rules, such 
desire must thus embrace the facilitating rule that his specific rules be understandable.   This 
macro-implementive thus also pushes back.  
Turning to Fuller’s fifth and sixth points, we are not, again, omnipotent. If the rule maker 
truly desires that we follow his rules, such desire must thus embrace the facilitating rules that his 
specific rules not be contradictory and not be otherwise impossible to perform. These macro-
implementives thus also push back.  
Turning to Fuller’s seventh point, we are not, again, omniscient, and therefore cannot 
follow rules changed with disorienting frequency.  If the rule maker truly desires that we follow 
his rules, such desire must thus embrace the facilitating rule that his specific rules have sufficient 
stability to be understandable.  This macro-implementive thus also pushes back.  
Turning to Fuller’s eighth point, we are not, again, omniscient and cannot therefore know 
rules except as they are promulgated to us. We therefore rely on them as promulgated. If the rule 
maker truly desires that we follow his rules, such desire must thus embrace the facilitating rule 
that his rules not be administered in a way that differs from their promulgation. This macro-
implementive thus also pushes back. (This macro-implementive, however, can be both easy and 
difficult in practice.  As an easy case, we should not of course be charged with speeding when 
we are driving below a posted numerical speed limit. Less specific terms, however, embrace 
more administrative flexibility.  For example, if the posted speed limit is instead “a reasonable 
speed under the circumstances,” our reliance on such promulgation expressly turns on more 
flexible terminology that demands more circumspection on our part. Although we might plead a 
defense lack of omniscience in such a case as well, such a plea would not seem compelling--in 
my view at least--since an ordinarily-competent driver should be capable of assessing what is “a 
reasonable speed under the circumstances” and can further protect herself by driving under that 
speed.
214
 ) 
 We can also go further than Fuller here.  Turning to a ninth and critical implementive, 
legal rules cannot serve as guides for conduct without facilitating certain allowances of 
speech.
215
  These facilitating allowances flow from the role of language itself in our semantic 
lifeworlds and from our lack of omniscience and the resulting necessity of speech with respect to 
rules in multiple ways. First, there must be speech to convey, implement, and enforce rules. 
Language sets out the rules which do not implement or enforce themselves. Human 
communication must facilitate that process including necessary allegations and testimony before 
and at hearings alleging breach of the rules. Second speech is required to follow rules. At the 
very least, we must be able to ask what rules mean, to obtain feedback as to how well we are 
following such rules, and to defend ourselves in the event of an alleged breach. So long as such 
legal rules remain in place, such implementive allowances of speech must therefore be 
recognized. This macro-implementive thus also pushes back.  
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46 
 
 This implementive universe of such allowed expression can be much larger than one 
might first imagine since statements involving the law can encompass much. Since the civil or 
criminal law or both can apply in some fashion to almost anything (if not everything) that we do, 
including such broad categories of our actions as “lawful behavior,” it is hard to see why at least 
some degree of implementive speech allowance is not required to explore and defend such broad 
categories of life as “lawful behavior.”  Of course, since behavior is either “lawful” or 
“unlawful,” it is hard to see what escapes at least some degree of implementive speech 
allowance.
216
 (It is unfortunately beyond the space limits of this article to begin tracing in more 
detail the outer limits of such broad implementive allowance of expression separate and apart 
from the First Amendment.
217
) 
 Turning to a tenth and further critical implementive, since governance by legal rules 
requires allowance of speech to the extent noted above, commensurate equal protection 
requirements must concomitantly follow such implementive allowance of speech.  It is hard to 
see, for example, how discounting the speech of one race and elevating the import of the speech 
of another race would be consistent with the implementive allowance of speech required for 
effective governance by legal rules.  This macro-implementive thus also pushes back.  (Again, it 
is unfortunately beyond the space limits of this article to begin tracing the scope of such 
implementive equal protection requirements separate and apart from those of the Equal 
Protection Clause.).  
 Finally, turning to an eleventh and further critical implementive, meaningful equal 
protection and freedom of speech cannot of course exist without necessary concomitant 
procedural due process. Where one must be able to speak and be heard by one’s government, one 
must have sufficient concomitant procedural due process to speak and be heard. One must have 
the same to enforce equal protection. Thus, governance by legal rules also implementively 
requires sufficient due process to facilitate such implementively-allowed speech and equal 
protection.   Procedural due process is also implementively required by the very nature of 
governance by rules.  Without such procedural due process, rules implode as internalized guides 
for individual conduct because the consequences of compliance (and even what constitutes 
compliance itself) become uncertain.  Without such procedural due process, one becomes a 
Desdemona
218
 potentially subject to condemnation no matter what one does.  This is not legally 
rule-governed activity under any meaningful sense of the term.  This macro-implementive thus 
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also pushes back. (Unfortunately, again, it is beyond the space limits of this article to begin 
tracing the scope of such implementive due process requirements separate and apart from those 
of the Due Process Clause.) 
 Of course, the above discussion presumes rule of law, and we can have a different 
situation entirely in the case of, for example, a sadistic dictator who delights in the promulgation 
of arbitrary and capricious “rules.” In that case, however, one can still see that semantic 
lifeworlds would nonetheless push back in multiple ways.  To the extent the dictator’s “rules” 
confuse rather than guide, they are not legal rules in the ordinary sense of “guides to human 
conduct and standards of criticism for such conduct.”219 The dictator would face the conceptual 
pushback discussed in Section IV-B-5-a above.  Additionally, the powerful force of common 
sense would push back in at least two ways.  First, rules which cannot be followed are in 
common parlance absurd
220
 —a black mark as we have seen in the eyes of that powerful 
semantic lifeworld force called “common sense.” Second, such a lawless dictator must face the 
powerful common sense notion that “no man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power 
to hinder.”221   
 Furthermore, as discussed in Section IV-C above and Appendix C below, morality is a 
workability factor, and the lawless dictator would “govern” in light of the pushback of a post-
Nuremburg world.
222
 No hermeneutic pragmatist can therefore support a lawless dictator, and 
hermeneutic pragmatism is therefore hardly “politically ambivalent” in this regard.223  
Hermeneutic pragmatism would instead remind the dictator of the possible consequences of his 
behavior running from the ridicule that excludes to Nuremburg.
224
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Appendix C 
 
Pre-semantic and Semantic Lifeworld Workability Restraints 
 
 1. Predictability 
 
   We want our concepts to help us navigate experience by, among other things, predicting 
how experience will unfold.  To see this, we can take again the example of the unfortunate blind 
child discussed in Section IV-A-1 above who also lacked the concept of a “cliff” and therefore 
had an unexpected fall. For something to work it of course must not lead to such inaccurate 
expectations or predictions of how the future will unfold (including how the pre-semantic will 
push back).  Predictability is thus a straightforward factor of workability though (as the 
following sections show) it does not exhaust what we mean by “workable.” 225   
 
 2. Organization and Coherence  
 
 In addition to the foregoing aspects of “workability,” “workable” concepts must, of 
course, work with every relevant aspect of the semantic lifeworlds we inhabit as well as with the 
pre-semantic. William James, again, succinctly describes such workability as a workable 
coherence that “fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience’s 
demands, nothing being omitted.” 226 
 
 a. Coherence of “Facts” and “Values” 
 
 i. Requiring Broad Coherence 
 
 James’s reference to “nothing being omitted” is of critical import.  If our concepts are to 
work, we can no more omit, for example, moral pushback than the pushback of a heavy door we 
are trying to open.  If we have no workable concepts for such moral pushback (including the 
pushback for justice and the respect for human dignity which I believe has roots in both the pre-
semantic and the pragmatic
227
), we can find ourselves in uncomfortable positions like Huck 
Finn’s discussed in Section IV-A-2 above (or worse). 
 Such broad coherence must thus involve coherence across objective experience (such as 
my current body temperature and other objective “facts”), subjective experience (such as my 
current private thoughts and speculations about my current body temperature), aesthetic and 
religious experience, personal and community values and standards, morality (including, again, 
justice and respect for human dignity), law, and other rules and principles having force in our 
semantic lifeworlds. 
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 ii. Maintaining Broad Coherence 
 
 As with simplicity, addressing such coherence may prove more difficult than might first 
appear: something may cohere well in one aspect of a semantic lifeworld and yet fail in another.  
When that happens, overall coherence fails.  For example, I might objectively solve a need for 
money by simply stealing it.  However, that would run afoul of both my personal values and 
general moral values and standards.  Stealing would thus not be a workable solution because it 
would not cohere with my personal values or with moral values and standards of the semantic 
lifeworld.  
 Similarly, in matters of law, a concept or notion may fail to cohere with the whole.  A 
state, for example, might need land for a dam and might conceive that simply seizing the land 
without compensation would be the simplest and thus best solution.  It would involve only one 
step while taking and paying would involve two steps.  If the state further lacked sufficient funds 
to buy the land, it might think this solution even more “workable” since it would give them a 
dam they would not otherwise be able to have. However, no such “simplest” solution would 
work because it would not fit with the limitations on the powers of states to take private property 
without just compensation.
228
  Additionally, it would not fit with moral rules: it is generally not 
right to take property without paying for it.  Laws that ignore the moral thus call out for revision 
to the extent they do not morally “work” no less than laws of physics call out for revision to the 
extent they do not physically “work.”  Hermeneutic pragmatism is thus hardly morally 
indifferent. 
 
  b. Coherence of Precedent 
 
 Consistent with the foregoing discussion of “workability,” respecting precedent can 
promote predictability (permitting those contemplating future action to rely on past decisions, 
practices, and views), economy (not wasting effort solving problems already solved), and 
coherence (treating similar cases alike).
229
   
 Such respect for precedent (though not unbending deference to erroneous precedent) thus 
plays a critical role in legal and other analysis.
230
 For example, imagine a parent who is satisfied 
with his decision to start his first child’s allowance when that child reached the age of ten. If the 
parent has no reason to think the “rule of ten” did not work, why would it not be a waste of effort 
to reconsider the rule when the second child reaches that age?  Furthermore, how would it be fair 
to treat the next child differently unless the parent had good reason to do so (such as financial 
setbacks or the second child’s behavior)?  Any change could also generate confusion for the next 
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child who, because of past example, might well have thought his allowance would also begin at 
age ten.  Why do that without good reason?   
 All that said, there can no doubt be good reason for change.  Reasons for respecting a 
given precedent can fail when, for example, there has been error, unfairness, or when other 
reasons arise that require new thought.  Refusing to rethink precedent in such situations can of 
course generate unfair results by perpetuating error or injustice or by reaching wrong results in 
changed circumstances.  Refusing to rethink precedent in such situations can also thwart judicial 
or mental economy by requiring periodic reconsideration or patches as discussed above where 
the precedent simply does not work well in practice and can also thwart predictability by the 
doubt that hangs over questionable prior decisions or rules.  When any of this happens, the very 
reasons of coherence, economy, fairness, and predictability that generally support precedent 
require us in such specific situations to reconsider specific precedent.
231
 
  
 c. Plausibility of Coherence 
 
 To the extent concepts do not seem plausible, common sense can resist them thereby 
potentially making their use less simple than alternative concepts not invoking such resistance.  
Thus, concepts are more workable to the extent they are plausible.
232
  Nonetheless, if the concept 
which is otherwise most workable seems initially implausible, we should advance such a concept 
with the view that its greater workability should render it not only plausible but acceptable over 
time.  Thomas Kuhn, for example, gives us a highly-useful extended exploration of how 
plausible scientific paradigms have been replaced over time.
233
 
 
 d. Metaphorical Privilege 
 
 Finally, in the face of such coherence and plausibility demands, we must tie back in the 
use of metaphor we have discussed earlier. We have already seen the acceptability of useful 
metaphorical contradiction. As discussed in Section III-A above, a metaphor equates “A” and 
“not-A,”234 and is thus by its very essence a contradiction.   
 To give a concrete example of such acceptable contradiction, quantum mechanics holds 
that light can be both a particle and a wave.
235
  Light, however, is not a particle (at least not in 
the sense of particles of dirt or dust or other common uses of the term) and it is not a wave (at 
least not in the sense of waves at the beach or at a lake or in other such common senses of the 
term).  All the more is the light now shining from my lamp not a contradictory combination of 
these two different things (a particle and a wave). My lamp neither seems to be pelting me with 
particles nor splashing me with waves much less “pelting-splashing” me with some contradictory 
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combination of such two different things. Yet, workable science can require that I use such a 
contradiction when exploring certain properties of light.
236
    
 This contradictory example of light as both a particle and a wave helps us grasp a 
metaphorical “privilege” required by the very complexity of life itself.  Because the following 
metaphors have different meanings that more accurately capture particular moments, we need to 
be able to say such contradictory things as “I’m slowly trudging my way through the day” and 
“The day is slowly passing me by.”  These statements are contradictory because the first casts 
time as stationary while the second casts time as moving.
237
  We need to recognize with Lakoff 
and Johnson that: 
 
To operate only in terms of a consistent set of metaphors is to hide many aspects of 
reality.  Successful functioning in our daily lives seems to require a constant shifting of 
metaphors.  The use of many metaphors that are inconsistent with one another seems 
necessary for us if we are to comprehend the details of our daily existence.
238
 
 
The demand for coherence is therefore not a prohibition of the inconsistencies of useful 
metaphors where such metaphors’ usefulness outweighs the usefulness of logical coherence. 
Coherence serves workability and not the reverse. We can also capture this point with a flexible 
notion of coherence itself: such flexible coherence demands the best overall fit.  If the best 
overall fit requires metaphorical contradiction, coherence in that broader sense demands it.
239
  
 
 3. Simplicity  
 
 a. Structural Simplicity 
 
 When examining such predictability, we are of course better served to the extent we can 
test our notions before we rely upon them, before we head toward the cliff so to speak.
240
  In this 
sense, more easily testable concepts thus work better than others.    Such reflections on ease of 
testing also involve further factors of workability: appropriate simplicity and economy.   
 As Peirce puts it, one should seek when constructing possible theories and concepts 
“Economy of money, time, thought, and energy.”241 As avoiding waste (whether of time or effort 
or otherwise) is a virtue on its face, one should of course prefer the simplest of otherwise-equally 
effective concepts or categories.
242
  Additionally, at least at first blush, the simpler should by 
definition be generally easier to use.  Furthermore, added complexity can increase the possibility 
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of error.
243
  Adding more moving parts to a machine, for example, adds more ways for the 
machine to break.  Where a machine with one moving part works just as well as a machine with 
two moving parts, why would one choose the more complex device which not only is therefore 
likely more difficult to maintain but offers two moving parts rather than one part subject to 
breakage?  Analysis of workability must therefore always involve simplicity analysis. The “post-
truth” person who buys a needlessly-complex widget maker, for example, could thus have done 
better. The lawyer who drafts a needlessly-complex document could also have done better. 
 
 b. Scope Simplicity 
 
 Simplicity and economy also apply at the level of scope.  If a single theory A can account 
for a range of matters that otherwise require adopting multiple theories B and C, one should as a 
matter of simplicity (if all other things are equal) adopt theory A rather than theories B and C.  
As Peirce puts it, “wide generalization will save repetitious work,” and we thus find “good 
economy, other things being equal, to make our hypotheses as broad as possible.”244 Of course, 
such hypotheses must be judged by all applicable restraints including all applicable forms of 
workability (which include the moral), and broadness of scope here does not therefore justify 
“post-truth” people who harbor broad delusions.  Scope simplicity should also apply, for 
example, to documents that lawyers draft.  If one document can as effectively address a 
transaction as three separate documents, one must of course ask why the lawyer would not wish 
to use a single document. 
 
 c. “Natural” Simplicity 
 
 All that said, however, Peirce also helps us see that “the logically simpler” hypothesis is 
not always the more “natural” hypothesis that accords with instinct.245  Peirce suggests that we 
should in such a case follow the more “natural” hypothesis on the assumption that we “have a 
natural bent in accordance with nature's.”246 If we have such a “bent,” then presumably the more 
“natural” hypothesis might more likely work. Even if we suspect we may not have such a “bent,” 
by seeming less foreign to the semantic lifeworlds we inhabit, the “more natural hypothesis” may 
be more likely to cohere with other aspects of those semantic lifeworlds in ways that work better 
overall. Furthermore, what better accords with “instinct” may better sense pre-semantic 
pushback and avoid the Huck Finn problem discussed in Section IV-A-2 above. (I believe that 
pre-semantic pushback results in both moral and factual concepts and frameworks that help 
withstand such pushback.) 
 
 d. Aesthetic, Religious, and Rhetorical Simplicity 
 
 Three other areas where the logically-simpler approach may not be simpler overall can 
involve aesthetics, religion, and rhetoric.   
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 i. Aesthetics 
 
 In the case of aesthetics, the “logically-simpler” approach may not always be the truly 
simpler approach.  For example, one can imagine choosing between proposed plans for a much 
needed bridge to encourage traffic into town.  One plan is a simple, ugly, brutalist bridge and the 
other is ornate and striking.  Because of its inherent draw, the more “logically complex” but 
more striking bridge may indeed be the “simpler” choice in the long run.  The ugly bridge may 
actually turn away (or at least not entice) travelers and may also require endless expenditures 
such as supplemental advertising, signage, and other measures to draw traffic. The lawyer 
advising the town in such a case would better serve her client if she brings to bear such a more 
aesthetically-sophisticated notion of simplicity.  Like adding the more aesthetic bridge, a judge, 
lawyer, or law student may find, for example, that adding more art or music to life can be one of 
the simplest ways to a fuller and more productive life. 
 
 ii. Religion  
 
 In the case of religion, the “logically-simpler” approach may also not always be the truly 
simpler approach.  Adding a deity, for example, to the cosmos is more “logically complex.”  
However, such addition does not change what we objectively experience (and thus does not 
interfere with day-to-day science).  Yet, it may, for example, provide a given judge, lawyer, or 
law student a more vivid inner life that in turn generates more and better legal or scholarly work 
than would otherwise result.
247
  Once again, the “logically simpler” might well not be the simpler 
life solution overall since it would result in both an emptier inner and outer life.  Instead, the 
added deity might be one of the simplest ways for such a judge, lawyer, or law student to have a 
fuller inner and outer life.  
 
 iii. Rhetoric 
  
 In the case of rhetoric, context appropriate “accumulation of arguments” can no doubt 
strengthen a case, and such accumulation should be measured in at least two ways: by “relations 
between arguments” (i.e., by how such accumulation strengthens or weakens the arguments) and 
by “diversity of audiences” (i.e., by how such accumulation affects the audience in play).248  
 Consistent with this, Peirce tells us that reasoning “should not form a chain which is no 
stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are 
sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.”249 If “sufficient” is taken to mean the optimum 
number of threads,
250
 this brilliant metaphor captures argumentative rather than “logical” 
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simplicity.  The former involves use of a sufficient number of threads which are no thicker than 
necessary and which are woven together in a way that best holds if every thread but one fails.  Of 
course, good judges, lawyers and law students weave such cables rather than forging chains.  
 
 e. Patching and Rigging 
 
 Unfortunately, what is “simpler” is not always as clear as in the one-part vs. two-part 
machine example above.  For example, when our one moving part machine breaks, should we 
patch the break or replace the entire machine?  A machine with a patch has an additional part 
lacking in an unpatched machine and is thus more complex in that sense.  However, the patch 
may have minimal cost and extend the life of the machine to the length of a replacement.   
 Measuring simplicity here simply in terms of the number of patches would be myopic.  
We should also consider the additional cost and effort required for a new machine (including 
removal of the old, introduction and placement of the new, and possible new training) which are 
complexities actually avoided by the patch.  However, what if that “simple” patch is required 
every week or every day or every hour?  At what point does it become simpler just to replace the 
machine? The scientific revolutions from Aristotle to Copernicus to Newton to Einstein give us 
non-legal examples of how long it has seemed sensible to patch and rig failing scientific 
models.
251
  
 In matters of law, we also have similar struggles over whether and how long to patch or 
rig our legal concepts and rules.  For example, if prohibiting same-sex marriage proves more and 
more a problem of equal protection, is it sufficient to patch or rig the problem by recognizing 
“equivalent” civil unions and continuing to prohibit same-sex unions?   From a simplicity 
standpoint, this is not a difficult question. Here we either open up a working vehicle (marriage) 
to others or require them to ride in a “separate but equal” new vehicle which we must now 
acquire and maintain.  To ask which approach is simpler really answers itself. The mere fact of 
adding and maintaining a new vehicle alongside another already working one is on its face more 
complex.  The one-vehicle solution on these facts is simpler and the Supreme Court has sensibly 
ended the patching and rigging here.
252
 
 
 4. Pre-semantic Pushback 
 
 In addition to “working” with aspects of semantic lifeworlds just discussed, "workable" 
concepts must be able to withstand the pre-semantic as well. This applies not only to pushback 
we would label as “physical” such as the cliff that faced the unfortunate child discussed above. It 
would apply to “non-physical” pushback as well.  For example, as we have discussed, Huck Finn 
encountered such non-physical pushback when he struggled over helping a slave escape. 
Workable concepts must therefore recognize all pushback of the pre-semantic, including what 
we would typically put into “moral,” “aesthetic,” and “religious” or “spiritual” as well as 
“physical” words. 
 In light of all such pre-semantic pushback, the “post-truth” person who believes that she 
can say or do anything and suffer no long-term consequences is seriously deluded.  As shown by 
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the blind child above who stepped off a cliff or those convicted at Nuremberg for crimes against 
humanity, workable semantic lifeworlds must respect pre-semantic pushback translatable both 
into the physical (as with the blind child) and the moral (as with the Nuremberg defendants).
253
 
In addition to committing evil, the Nuremberg defendants who committed crimes against 
humanity under color of local law were fools to ignore the moral pushback that such local laws 
ignored as well.  Judges, lawyers, and law students should, of course, also be aware the limits of 
terms and concepts currently in play and the possibilities of the pre-semantic yet to be put into 
words. 
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